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In the first essay, I demonstrate that during the 1970s, the marital behavior
of US Catholics changed dramatically relative to that of the total population.
The Catholic marriage rate, that is, the number of Catholic marriages per 1000
Catholics, decreased nearly 20 percent relative to the civil marriage rate. Before
and after this time period, the two rates moved in unison. Empirically, I find
that the Catholic reforms and encyclicals of the 1960s, that is, Vatican II and
Humanae Vitae, led to a decrease in the Catholic marriage rate relative to the
civil marriage rate and that the reform of civil divorce law had no effect on this
relative rate.
In the second essay, I expand the analysis of the previous essay and test
whether a negative response among US Catholics to the reforms of Vatican II and
to Humanae Vitae is able to explain the increase in the civil marriage rate, the
decrease in the Catholic marriage rate, and the increase in the interfaith marriage
rate seen in the data. To do this, I construct an original model that treats marriage
as a set of two contracts, one civil and one religious, with the benefit and cost of
the religious contract depending upon a social complementarity. The theory and
the data match if the primary effect of 1960s Catholic reform was to decrease the
benefit of a Catholic marriage.
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In the third essay, I examine the link between religiosity and the incidence
of domestic abuse and model sanctification as the pathway connecting the two.
Sanctification is ”a psychological process through which aspects of life are per-
ceived by people as having spiritual character or significance”[25]. In the model,
the abuser must his choose level of abuse, and both abuser and abused must al-
locate a scarce amount of time between the production of a marital good and a
personal consumption good. Sanctification is modeled as an increase in the re-
turn to time invested in the marital good. Theoretically, abuse increases in both
spouses’ level of sanctification and the wife’s productivity and decreases in the
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Religious motivations have largely been neglected by economic theorists.
When modeling the behavior of individuals, economists look to more ’concrete’
and easily quantifiable motivations, such as prices, income, and wealth. Rarely
do they model an individual’s behavior as dependent upon socials norms or, more
specifically, religious norms. Recently, George Akerlof devoted the entirety of his
American Economic Association presidential address to this issue, which he refers
to as ’the missing motivation’[1]. Akerlof describes how economists generally ne-
glect including social norms as motivating factors in their theoretical work and
how the inclusion of these norms would overturn some commonly held theoretical
results. Following from Akerlof’s criticism, in this dissertation I model domestic
behavior as dependent upon personal religious beliefs and religious norms. Specif-
ically, I include religious motivations and norms in the modeling of a single agent’s
marital decision and of a potentially abusive marriage with the goal of more fully
specifying an individual’s motivation for action and more accurately predicting
his behavior.
Within the last twenty years, economists have begun to use rational choice
theory to model and to explain religious behavior. The work of Iannaccone con-
cerning religious human capital[21] and religious groups[22] largely started this
trend. This research, though not the first formal model of religious behavior, that
credit goes to Azzi and Ehrenberg[3], more thoroughly popularized the idea that
economic theory, a theory that is based on the assumption of rational behavior,
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could be used to explain a realm of human experience and behavior that is typ-
ically thought irrational, that is, the realm of religious experience and behavior.
Regretfully, it seems to me that sociologists and religious studies researchers are
much more willing to adopt the theory and methodology of economics than are
economists to incorporate the findings of sociology into their building of formal
models. This relates directly back to Akerlof’s criticism mentioned in the previous
paragraph.
The efforts of Iannaccone and those following him have gone a long way in
explaining religious behavior in economic terms. They have addressed whether a
competitive religious environment or a monopolistic religious environment breeds
a more religious population[13], why religious groups with more stringent require-
ments tend to be highly successful[22], and, more ambitiously, the rise of and the
eventual dominance of Catholic Church over paganism[38]. What these efforts
have largely not done is to incorporate religious motivation into more general eco-
nomic theories, for example, theories of domestic behavior. I attempt to address
this gap by constructing models explaining marital choice and the incidence of
domestic violence and including in those models religious motivation and norms
along with more typical motivations, such as financial and time considerations.
In Chapter 2, I present data demonstrating the divergence in behavior
between the US civil marriage rate and US Catholic marriage rate, the number
of Catholic marriages consecrated each year divided by the number of Catholics,
that occurred during the 1970s. What makes this curious is that before and after
this time period, the two rates moved in unison. No economic theory is able to
explain this divergence between the two rates. The most relevant, available theory
is that of Matouschek and Rasul[27] or that of Rasul[33]. These two theories treat
marriage as a contract, but they are deficient because they treat marriage as a
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single contract. How can a model that treats marriage as a single contract explain
two rates, especially when these two rates are behaving differently? Simply put,
it cannot. To remedy this deficiency in Chapter 3, I construct a theory that
explains marital behavior but, unlike previous theories, it incorporates religious
motivations by modeling marriage as a set of two contracts, one civil and one
religious. This model, though not explicitly based upon the work of Akerlof[2]
and Bernheim[5], follows their work in spirit by modeling the entry cost, benefit,
and the exit cost of the religious contract of marriage as dependent upon a social
complementarity.
Sociologists have demonstrated the influence of religiosity on the incidence
of domestic violence, but no economic theory is able to account for this influence
since none models religiosity as a factor in an abuser’s decision to engage in
violence. In fact, there are extremely few theories attempting to explain domestic
abuse and, those that do are largely driven by the differences in wealth and income
between the two spouses[12, 39]. In Chapter 4, I construct a sequential model
of a potentially abusive marriage. In the model, both husband and wife must
allocate a scarce amount of time between producing a marital good and a personal
consumption good, and the husband (the abuser) chooses a level of violence to
direct towards his wife. Violence has two purposes in the model, one is to vent
stress (expressive violence) and one is to coerce the wife to behave in a certain
manner (instrumental violence). I construct this theory with the aim of explaining
both the correlation between income and the incidence of domestic abuse and the
correlation between religiosity and domestic abuse.
Thus, in this dissertation I hope to demonstrate the usefulness of including
religiosity and religious norms as motivating factors in an individual’s decision pro-
cess. By including these motivations more widely in economic theories, I believe
3
the predictive ability of these theories would be greatly increased.
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Chapter 2
The Divergence of Civil and Catholic Marital
Behavior in the United States
2.1 Introduction
In the United States during the mid to late 1970s, the marital behavior
of Catholics changed dramatically relative to the marital behavior of the total
population. The Catholic marriage rate, that is, the number of Catholic marriages
consecrated annually per 1000 Catholics, fell approximately 20 percent relative to
the civil marriage rate, that is, the number of civil marriages performed annually
per l000 individuals. This relative decrease was the result of an increase of 2
percent in the civil marriage rate and a decrease of 17 percent in the Catholic
marriage rate. What makes this curious is that both before and after this period,
the two marriage rates moved in tandem. The goal of this essay is to explain the
divergence of the Catholic and civil marriage rates in the United States.
I propose two potential causes for this divergence. The first is the reforms
in and around the time of the Second Vatican Council, 1962 to 1965. I believe these
reforms caused a decrease in both the benefit to and the exit cost of a Catholic
marriage. For example, the controversial nature of Humanae Vitae, an encyclical
that upheld the traditional ban on birth control and abortion, perhaps lessened
the benefit of the Catholic institution of marriage; and the reforms of Vatican II
decreased the exit cost of a Catholic marriage, that is, the difficulty of getting an
annulment. The second is the reform of civil divorce law in the United States.
During the 1970s United States divorce law underwent the ”no-fault revolution”
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in which the majority of states shifted from a fault, mutual consent divorce law
regime to a no-fault, unilateral consent divorce law regime, thus lowering the
exit costs of a civil marriage. The timing of these reforms suggests a possible
connection between the reforms themselves and the divergence in the civil and
Catholic marriage rates.
To explore the implications of the proposed causes, I model marriage as
a set of two contracts, one civil and one religious. I have chosen to model mar-
riage in this manner because these two contracts have distinct benefits and costs
and because entering one contract does not imply that an individual has entered
the other. Some examples of the entry costs of the civil contract are scheduling
an appointment with and appearing before a justice of the peace and paying a
nominal fee; and of the Catholic contract are booking a church, finding a priest,
and attending pre-marital counseling. Some examples of the exit costs of a civil
contract are bearing the costs of a lawyer and of a potentially unfavorable finan-
cial settlement as well as the time lost in divorce proceedings; and of the religious
contract are filing a petition of nullity and acquiring a reputational stigma at
the divorcees’ parish church. Also, I believe that there is a qualitative difference
between the benefit and cost of a civil marriage and the benefit and cost of a
Catholic marriage; those of a Catholic marriage are more heavily dependent upon
the beliefs and actions of the surrounding community. The benefit and cost of
a Catholic marriage would be greatly reduced if no one besides those marrying
professed to being Catholic.
Given that I am treating marriage as a set of two institutions, or contracts,
the question then arises as to why changes in one institution would affect the
behavior related to the other institution. What causes the interconnectedness of
the two institutions? This interconnectedness arises because a couple is potentially
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entering two contracts for one arrangement, that is, a couple may enter both a civil
and Catholic marriage contract simultaneously for a single marriage. A couple
makes this choice based upon the relative costs and benefits of each contract. For
example, if a change in one institution causes its relative value to increase, then a
couple may choose to substitute towards the relatively more valuable institution.
More specifically, why would the reform of civil divorce law affect Catholic marital
behavior? Imagine that pre-reform a specific couple has decided to marry both
civilly and religiously, then the exit cost of a civil marriage contract is lowered
while the characteristics of the Catholic contract are held constant. This reform
increases the relative value of civil marriage, and this couple may choose to forego
the Catholic contract and marry only civilly. If one were to imagine this occurring
on a national scale, the Catholic marriage rate would decrease relative to the civil
marriage rate after divorce law reform.
I use the model to answer four questions: what is the effect of the shift to
unilateral consent on the relative marriage rate1? what is the effect of the shift
to no-fault divorce on the relative marriage rate? what is the effect of a decrease
in the exit cost of a Catholic marriage on the relative marriage rate? and what
is the effect of a decrease in the benefit of a Catholic marriage on the relative
marriage rate? The model predicts that the shift to unilateral consent will have
no effect on the relative marriage rate and that the shift to no-fault divorce will
cause a decrease in the relative marriage rate. Catholic reforms potentially had
two effects, a decrease in the exit cost of a Catholic marriage and a decrease in
the benefit of a Catholic marriage. If the decrease in the exit cost is the dominant
effect of the two, then the model predicts that the relative marriage rate will
1The ratio of the Catholic marriage rate to the civil marriage rate in any given year is referred
to as the ”relative marriage rate” throughout this paper.
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increase; if the decrease in the benefit is the dominant effect, then the relative
marriage rate will decrease.
Empirically, I test whether the divergence between the civil and Catholic
marriage rates is correlated with the timing of divorce law reform and Catholic
doctrinal reform. I find that neither the shift to no-fault divorce nor the shift to
unilateral consent had a statistically significant effect on the ratio of the Catholic
marriage rate to the civil marriage rate but that Catholic reforms did cause a
decrease in the Catholic marriage rate relative to the civil marriage rate. Thus,
I come to three conclusions. The first is that the dominant effect of Catholic
reforms was to decrease the benefit of a Catholic marriage, at least relative to
the exit cost. The second is that couples choosing between marrying civilly or
marrying both civilly and religiously are not significantly affected by changes in
the exit cost of either of the two institutions. The third is that the most likely
cause of the decrease in the relative marriage rate is the religious reform of the
Catholic Church.
To my knowledge, marriage has not been studied formally and empirically
as a set of two institutions. Numerous researchers have examined the relationship
between civil divorce law and civil divorce rates. Among others, Friedberg[15]
and Wolfers[41] have examined this relationship. Two of the very few papers that
examine the effect of divorce law reforms on the civil marriage rate are Rasul[33]
and Matouschek and Rasul[27]. All of these studies fail to differentiate between
the two institutions of marriage, and, as such, they fail to specify fully the motives
individuals have for entering or exiting a given marital arrangement. Due to this,
they are unable to explain or predict behavior that arises from an individual’s
choosing between the two institutions of marriage. Therefore, this distinction
should be made not only for the sake of clarity and completeness but also to
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increase the explanatory power of the theory.
An additional reason for distinguishing between civil and Catholic mar-
riage is that the Catholic marriage rate could be a better proxy for the strength
of the social institution of marriage. The ultimate measure of the previous re-
search examining civil marriage and divorce rates is its utility in assessing the
strength and the factors affecting the strength of the social institution of mar-
riage. The strength of the institution is directly related to and supported by the
strength of the norms that direct individuals to marry and in which manner to
marry and those that stigmatize divorce. Those entering into a religious marriage
are likely more serious about the commitment they are undertaking than those
entering only a civil marriage due to the added severity religion incorporates into
marriage and are more strongly guided by social customs and norms. Due to this,
the Catholic marriage rate is potentially a better indicator of the strength of the
norms supporting marriage and stigmatizing divorce and therefore the strength of
the institution of marriage. Lastly, examining the interaction of the civil institu-
tion and the religious institution of marriage can help one generally to understand
better how legal and social institutions interact and affect one another. For ex-
ample, researchers can better understand when the two types of institutions are
complements and when they are substitutes. These types of interactions should
be better understood to ensure stable social institutions with the aim of increasing
overall social welfare.
I contribute to the theoretical literature with my novel recasting of marriage
as a set of two contracts and my study of the interaction between these two
contracts. I know of no other papers that formally consider marriage as a ’dual’
contract. In fact, even formally considering marriage as a contract is relatively new
to the economics literature. Moreover, I contribute to the empirical literature by
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studying the effect of lowering the cost of civil divorce and of Catholic annulment
and of increasing the benefit of Catholic marriage on both the civil and Catholic
marriage rates simultaneously, as opposed to focusing solely on civil reform and
its effect on the civil marriage rate.
2.2 Potential Explanations
During the 1960s, the doctrine of the Catholic Church was reexamined in
detail and updated to ’modern’ standards as the Church saw fit. This process
may have decreased the benefit of a Catholic marriage. On the one hand, to
some Catholics the reforms of Vatican II might have seemed to abandon Catholic
orthodoxy and to cause the Church to become less differentiated from other re-
ligions. If the Church had become less distinct from other religions and secular
society, the value of marrying in the Church would have decreased as well because
there would be a less distinct benefit to entering the Catholic institution. On the
other hand, the upholding of traditional doctrine, for example, Humanae Vitae,
might have lessened more progressive individuals’ support of the Church. Hout
and Greeley[20] present evidence that after Humanae Vitae, church attendance
among Catholics dropped dramatically until 1975 due to the Church’s upholding
of traditional doctrine regarding sexual morality, specifically, its continued ban
on artificial birth control. No other major religion has seen a decline in church
attendance over the last century. Though church attendance dropped, very few
Catholics actually left the Church; they merely reduced their participation in
church services. For example, a Catholic who once attended mass on a weekly
basis might now only attend on a monthly basis, but he or she would still choose
to remain a Catholic. The act of reformation undertaken by the Catholic Church
during the 1960s seems to have upset both traditionalist and progressive Catholics,
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Table 2.1: CARA Survey Responses
Pre-Vatican II Vatican II Post-Vatican II
Ever Divorced 11 21 7
Divorce is usually best solution
when a couple can’t seem to work out 27* 34 26
their marriage problems
Marriage is a lifelong commitment 73** 56 67
Marriage is a calling from God 43** 23 28
Marriage is a vocation 44** 20 24
Notes: Source: CARA Survey (2007). Each number is the percentage of those respondents
from each generation responding. *Percentage who agree ”somewhat” or ”strongly.”
**Percentage who say this statement is ”very consistent with my views.”
testing their faith in and devotion to the Church.
The decrease in the benefit of Catholic marriage that occurred during and
after 1960s Catholic reform is evidenced by a survey conducted in 2007 by the
Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate (CARA). This survey questioned
Catholics regarding the sacrament of Holy Matrimony. Those surveyed included
members of the Pre-Vatican II Generation (aged 65 and over), Vatican II Gener-
ation (aged 47 to 64), and Post-Vatican II Generation (aged 26 to 46). Generally,
”members of this generation [Vatican II] are more likely than the generations be-
fore them to emphasize concerns of individual self-actualization over institutional
commitment” (p. 14). The children of the Vatican II Generation ”grew up at
a time when divorce rates rose rapidly (among the Vatican II Generation) and
seemingly intractable socio-economic problems grew. This ’survivor’ generation
is relatively less likely to make long-term commitments” (p. 14). Thus, the gen-
erations following the reforms of Vatican II seem to benefit from the institution
of marriage less than those before Vatican II. The Vatican II Generation seems
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to benefit from Catholic marriage less than even the Post-Vatican II generation.
They are less likely to believe marriage is a life-long commitment and more likely
to believe divorce is the best solution when a couple’s marital problems seem un-
solvable. Apropos the sacredness of the institution, the Vatican II Generation
is less likely to believe that marriage is a vocation or a calling from God. (see
Table 2.1) Thus, the benefit of a Catholic marriage in the eyes of many Catholics
seems to have fallen after Vatican II with the most dramatic decrease immediately
following the religious council.
This process of reform also decreased the exit cost of a Catholic marriage
since annulments were afterwards more easily obtained. The primary purpose
of Catholic marriage was changed so as to equate ”the good of the spouses”
and ”the procreation and education of children” in importance[40]. Before this
time, the primary purpose was ”the procreation and education of children.” This
change allowed more petitions of nullity to be approved. Empirical evidence of
the increased ease of obtaining an annulment is that during the 1970s the number
of annulments granted in the United States increased six-fold[40].
In the ”no-fault revolution” of the 1970s, divorce law was reformed in
two ways: fault-based divorce was changed to no-fault-based and mutual consent
divorce was changed to unilateral consent. The first type of reform eliminated
both the prerequisite of finding marital fault for the dissolution of a marriage and
the use of marital fault as a consideration in financial settlement. In the literature,
this reform is accepted as decreasing the exit cost of a civil marriage. The second
type of reform eliminated the requirement that both spouses consent for a marriage
to be dissolved and instead required the consent of only one spouse. As is typical
in the literature following Becker et al.[4], I consider this reform as a reassignment
of the right to divorce within a marriage. Under the mutual consent regime, the
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spouse who desires to remain married holds the right to divorce because he or
she is the determining factor in whether the couple divorces; under the unilateral
consent regime, the situation is reversed and the spouse who desires to divorce
holds the right because he or she is now the determining factor. According to the
Coase Theorem, this initial allocation of rights, in this case, the right to divorce,
does not affect the outcome of the bargaining problem because as long as the
utility surplus of remaining married over the spouses’ being single is positive,
then this surplus can be distributed so as to keep the marriage intact irrelevant
of who holds the right to divorce. Therefore, I expect that the shift from mutual
consent to unilateral consent would not affect the incidence of divorce, either civil
or Catholic. As such, in my model I focus on the shift to no-fault divorce.
In addition to these two causes, one might suspect a demographic shift
or the social changes of the 1960s as a cause of the relative change in Catholic
marital behavior. For a demographic shift to be a plausible explanation for the
divergence of marriage rates, the shift must be a relative shift in the Catholic
population. For example, if the age distributions of the US Catholic population
and the total US population are very similar and both become younger over time,
that might explain an increase or decrease in the marriage rates but that would
not explain a divergence between the two marriage rates. Until the late 1980s,
the two age distributions were probably very similar, leading me to conclude a
demographic shift is not in fact a reasonable explanation.2 To attempt to control
for any nationwide social changes occurring during this time period, I include year
2I thank Paul Perl at CARA for this information. He adds one caveat saying that within the
last 10 to 20 years the age distribution of Catholics has most likely become younger than the
general population because of the growing number of Hispanic Catholics in the United States.
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fixed effects. These fixed effects should control for any covariates that are time-
dependent but state-independent. In this manner, I can focus on specific reforms
and their consequences while controlling for social change.
2.3 Secular and Catholic Marital Law
When one refers to US divorce law reform, one is actually referring to
two legal changes, the first is a change from ”fault” to ”no-fault” divorce and
the second is a change from ”mutual consent” to ”unilateral consent” divorce.
The definitions of ”fault” and ”consent” can become quite convoluted considering
that numerous researchers have defined their own codifications of the timing of
these reforms. Especially in regard to no-fault reform, these codifications vary
significantly because fault enters civil divorce proceedings in two ways, as grounds
for dissolution of a marriage and as a consideration in division of financial assets
after a marriage has been dissolved. Under ”fault” divorce, one spouse has to be
found guilty of an offence against the other spouse for there to be grounds for
divorce; also, this ”fault” is given due accord when determining alimony, child
custody, and general division of assets. ”Mutual consent” divorce requires the
consent of both spouses to dissolve a marriage, and ”unilateral” divorce requires
the consent of only one spouse. ”Unilateral” divorce itself comes in at least two
varieties, with and without separation requirements. For example, if there is a
two-year separation requirement, then, in addition to the consent of one spouse,
the couple must live in different households for two years before a divorce can
legally be granted.
There are several codifications in the law and economics, economics, and
sociology literature. For the shift to no-fault divorce, these are Nakonezny et
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al.[29], Brinig and Buckley[6], Ellman and Lohr[11], and Gruber[19]. Nakonezny
and his co-authors, who are psychologists, code legal reforms based upon both pri-
mary and secondary sources, though mostly secondary sources, and seem to imply
that what they mean by ”no-fault” is that no spouse needs to be found guilty of
marital fault for there to be legal grounds for the dissolution of a marriage and also
that fault is not a consideration in financial settlement of a divorce. Brinig and
Buckley, who are lawyers, construct their coding from primary sources and explic-
itly state that ”no-fault” divorce for them means that there are no-fault grounds
for the dissolution of a marriage and fault is not a consideration in financial set-
tlement. Their coding differs significantly from that of Nakonezny et al. Ellman
and Lohr, a lawyer and statistician respectively, have numerous codings based on
whether fault is required for the dissolution of a marriage or is a consideration
in financial settlement; these codings are based on both primary and secondary
sources. Their coding that captures the shift to ”no-fault” financial settlement is
quite similar to that of Brinig and Buckley. For the shift to unilateral divorce,
the most common codings are Friedberg[15] and Gruber[19]. These authors, both
of whom are economists, use the same definition of ”unilateral” divorce and have
similar codings. Gruber states that his coding is a reexamination and updating
of Friedberg’s.
Ellman and Lohr[11] is my preferred coding for no-fault reform dates (see
Table 2.2), and Friedberg[15] is my preferred coding for unilateral reform dates
(see Table 2.3). Ellman and Lohr’s coding is chosen for three reasons. The first
is that they are very clear as to what their definition of ”no-fault” is. Secondly,
they have a coding for the specific type of no-fault divorce in which I am inter-
ested in studying. The strongest form of ”no-fault” and the one that I believe
is most likely to affect behavior is the form in which there are no-fault grounds
15
Table 2.2: No-Fault Reform Dates
Ellman and Lohr Ellman and Lohr
Separation Irretrievable Property Separation Irretrievable Property
State Breakdown Division State Breakdown Division
AL 1971 MT 1975 1975
AK 1935 1974 1974 NE 1972 1972
AZ 1973 1973 NV 1931 ?
AR 1937 1979 1979 NH 1971
CA 1969 1969 NJ 1971 1980
CO 1971 1971 NM 1973 1976
CT 1973 NY 1966
DE 1970 1974 1974 NC 1931
FL 1971 1986 ND 1971
GA 1973 OH 1974
HI 1972 1960 OK 1953 1975
ID 1971 1990 OR 1971 1971
IL 1983 1977 PA 1980
IN 1973 1973 RI 1975
IA 1970 1972 SC 1969
KS 1969 1990 SD 1985
KY 1972 TN 1977
LA 1965 TX 1925 1969
ME 1973 1985 UT 1953 1987 1987
MD 1937 VT 1941
MA 1975 VA 1960
MI 1971 WA 1973 1973
MN 1974 1974 WV 1977
MS 1976 WI 1969 1977 1977
MO 1973 WY 1977
16
Table 2.3: Unilateral Reform Dates
State Friedberg Gruber State Friedberg Gruber
AL 1971 1971 MT 1975 1973
AK pre-1968 1935 NE 1972 1972
AZ 1973 1973 NV 1973 1967
AR NH 1971 1971
CA 1970 1970 NJ
CO 1971 1972 NM 1973 1933
CT 1973 1973 NY
DE 1968 NC
FL 1971 1971 ND 1971 1971
GA 1973 1973 OH
HI 1973 1972 OK pre-1968 1953
ID 1971 1971 OR 1973 1971
IL PA
IN 1973 1973 RI 1976 1975
IA 1970 1970 SC
KS 1969 1969 SD 1985 1985
KY 1972 1972 TN
LA TX 1974 1970
ME 1973 1973 UT 1987
MD VT
MA 1975 1975 VA
MI 1972 1972 WA 1973 1973




for divorce and fault is not a consideration in financial settlement. Ellman and
Lohr’s coding for this type of ”no-fault” is a revision of that of Brining and Buck-
ley[6] and therefore seems to be the slightly more accurate. Lastly, Ellman is a
trained lawyer, and thus his work is more likely to be accurate than the work of
a non-lawyer. For unilateral reform, I choose Friedberg’s coding mainly because
Wolfers[41] does. Since there are not significant differences between Friedberg
and Gruber[19], this choice does not significantly alter my results. Additionally,
as Wolfers does, I replace Friedberg’s coded reform year for Alaska and Oklahoma
with that of Gruber because Friedberg does not code specific dates for these two
states, only that these reforms occurred before her sample period, that is, before
1968.
When one speaks of Catholic marriage, it is important to distinguish be-
tween divorce and annulment. By divorce, one means a dissolution of an existing
marriage. By annulment, one means an official declaration that states the said
marriage was never valid. Therefore, a marriage is not dissolved by an annulment;
it is declared to have never existed. The Catholic Church does not recognize any
form of divorce, only annulment. If a Catholic marriage is valid, it is eternal, and
there is no way for it to be dissolved. The only way to exit a Catholic marriage
is for it to be anulled. This could be declared for procedural reasons, perhaps the
ceremony was not performed in the correct manner, or for psychological or emo-
tional reasons, such as one or both of the two parties being unable to consent free
of coercion. When one desires to have his marriage annulled, he files a petition
of nullity with his local Catholic tribunal. The process following the filing of the
petition is similar to that that takes place in a secular court of law. An important
consequence of not receiving an annulment is that a divorced Catholic is unable
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Figure 2.1: National Marriage Rates
2.4 National Data
I examine time series of the US Catholic population level, the US Catholic
marriage level, the US population level, and the US civil marriage level at the
national level. All time series run from 1963-1993. The US Catholic population
and the number of US Catholic marriages are from the Official Catholic Directory
(OCD). The OCD presents the official statistics for the Catholic Church in the
United States annually. The US population is from the US Census Bureau, and
the number of US civil marriages is from the National Vital Statistics report of
the Center for Disease Control and Prevention.
Figure 2.1 shows the US civil marriage rate, that is, the number of civil
marriages performed annually per 1000 individuals, and the US Catholic marriage
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Figure 2.2: Catholic Marriage Per Capita Catholic
Catholic, for 1963 to 1993. From 1963 to 1971, the Catholic marriage rate trends
upward, increasing 19 percent. In 1971 the trend reverses and the rate decreases
21 percent during the 1970s. During the 1980s the trend continues downward
but more slowly, decreasing 12 percent. Initially, the civil marriage rate behaves
similarly, trending upward and reversing trend in 1972. Then in 1975 it deviates
from the Catholic rate, and in 1977 the civil rate begins to increase and diverges
completely from the Catholic rate. Finally, in 1982 the civil marriage begins to
decrease, and the two rates once again follow a similar trend, though they do so
with a larger distance separating them.
Until 1975, the similarity in behavior of the two marriage rates is striking;
equally striking is their divergence in behavior after 1975. Figure 2.2 more clearly
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Figure 2.3: Catholic Marriages as Percentage of Total US Marriages
rate; the dashed line is what the Catholic marriage would have been had it grown
at the same rate as the civil rate. To construct the dashed line, I started with the
number of Catholic marriages in 1963 and grew this series at the same rate as the
number of civil marriages, then divided the series by the US Catholic population.
One can see that the two series behave similarly until the mid 1970’s then diverge
until the early 1980’s when they both follow the same trend. It is as if before
1975 both rates were in equilibrium, then there was a shift in the environment.
Around 1982 once again the two rates settled into an new equilibrium relative to
one another, albeit an equilibrium in which there was a larger difference between
the two rates. I believe this ”shift in the environment” to be either the reform of
civil divorce law or the reforms surrounding Vatican II.
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Figure 2.4: Timing of Legal Reforms
rate divided by the civil marriage rate. Between 1971 and 1979, this statistic
decreased 22 percent from ≈ .82 to ≈ .64. Again one can see that in the mid to
late 1970’s the marital behavior of Catholics changed drastically relative to the
total population. This behavioral change is not due to a change in the relative
size of the US Catholic population; the US Catholic population relative to the
total US population stays fairly constant over this 30 year period, ≈ 24 percent
of the total US population.
Under the Ellman and Lohr[11] coding, 24 states had no-fault divorce laws
in place as of 1998. Of these 24, 17 changed their laws between 1969 and 1979.
Under the Friedberg[15] coding, 31 states had unilateral divorce laws in place,
and 28 reformed their laws between 1969 and 1977. The year the median state
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Figure 2.5: Catholic Population under Reformed Law
fault divorce is 1974. As Figure 2.4 shows, these legal reforms occurred in a similar
time frame as the divergence in the two marriage rates. The dashed line on the
left is the year the median state instituted unilateral reform and on the right the
year the median state instituted no-fault reform. Both of these median reforms
occur before and near the divergence of the two marriage rates.
Additionally, when these two rates begin to behave differently, a significant
portion of the population lived in a state with reformed laws in place. In Figure
2.5, the upper green dashed line is the percentage of the US Catholic population
that was living under unilateral divorce, and the dashed orange line is the per-
centage living under no-fault divorce. At the time of the divergence in marital
behavior, half of the population of Catholics was living under unilateral divorce
and nearly a third under no-fault divorce. According to other, less stringent def-
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initions of no-fault divorce, nearly 90 percent of the population was living under
no-fault divorce at this time.
The Second Vatican Council occurred between 1962 and 1965. Humanae
Vitae, the encyclical that upheld the traditional Catholic teachings regarding sex-
ual morality, was released in 1968. Both of these occurred near the divergence of
the two marriage rates. They occurred slightly earlier than the reform of divorce
law, and therefore had a longer window of time between them and the decrease
in the relative marriage rate. This is not troublesome though, since social reform
would be expected to take longer to become effective than legal reform. These
reforms applied on a national level, and therefore all US Catholics were poten-
tially affected by them. Both the timing of legal and religious reforms and the
proportion of the population living under them suggest that they were able to
have a significant effect on marriage rates.
The fact that there was a delay of 7 to 10 years between the reform of
Catholic doctrine and the change in marital behavior of both Catholics and the
general populus may seem a concern, but this span of time was necessary for ado-
lescent Catholics in their pre-teenage and early teenage years to acquire a negative
evaluative preference of the Catholic institution of marriage and therefore choose
not to marry religiously. I believe adolescent Catholics adopted this negative pref-
erence because they came to associate increased conflict with Catholic marriage.
The increased conflict that these youths were observing was due to the mixed
reaction of the Catholic community to Vatican II and Humanae Vitae.
It has been shown that the quality of a marriage is positively correlated
with the similarity of attitudes towards marriage between parent and child[7]. If
a child’s parents are involved in a high quality marriage, the child forms a positive
evaluative preference of the parents’ specific type of marital union. When the child
24
enters into a relationship and decides what type of marital union to enter, he will
choose to follow the example of his parents and to enter into a type of marital union
similar to theirs. In the opposite scenario, the child comes to disapprove of his
parents’ relationship and rejects their specific type of marital union. Thus, what
a child observes in his parents’ relationship strongly influences the relationship
decisions that he makes in early adulthood. Church attendance and religious
devotion are associated with greater marital happiness and a lower risk of conflict
within a marriage[35]. Given this correlation and the fact that between 1968 and
1975 church attendance decreased by one-third among Catholics alone and no
other major religious group[20], this potentially points to an increase in marital
conflict and a decrease in marital happiness among Catholics. Another piece
of evidence that suggests an increase in discord in Catholic communities is that
after Vatican II and Humanae Vitae, the percentage of a state’s population that
is Catholic was negatively correlated with the Catholic marriage rate; whereas,
before Vatican II and Humanae Vitae, this correlation was positive. Seeing this
increase in discord, children of the Vatican II generation would adopt an attitude
toward Catholic marriage dissimilar to their parents, that is, they would choose
not to enter into a Catholic marriage.
To understand better the above process and why it might have taken nearly
a decade to influence the marital attitudes of adolescents, I turn to the social
psychology literature on attitude formation.3 Social psychologists predominantly
treat attitudes as learned predispositions[8]. One of the dominant theories of at-
titude formation, especially with regard to the evaluative nature of attitudes, is
3In addition to cited sources, this paragraph is based upon the articles on attitude for-
mation, attitude change, and classical conditioning in The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social
Psychology [26].
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classical conditioning[36, 37]. The gist of this theory is that an unconditioned
stimulus, that is, a stimulus that is inherently pleasing or displeasing, becomes
associated with a conditioned stimulus, that is, a stimulus that has no inherent
pleasure value. Thus, the conditioned stimulus comes to elicit the same response,
either pleasing or displeasing, as the unconditioned stimulus. In this specific in-
stance, stress and conflict, the unconditioned stimuli, become associated with
Catholic marriage, the conditioned stimulus, in the eyes of adolescents living in
Catholic households; and thus the adolescents come to think negatively of Catholic
marriage. This conditioning process is not immediate and requires repeated ex-
posure to the pair of unconditioned and conditioned stimuli to become reinforced
in the subject. The 7 to 10 year lag between Catholic reform and the change
in marital behavior can be explained as the length of time necessary to form a
negative evaluative preference of Catholic marriage in pre-marital adolescents and
to reinforce these preferences.
2.5 Theoretical Implications
The model presented here is a modified version of Matouschek and Ra-
sul[27]. In this model, I focus on the changes in marital behavior that are re-
sponses to the decrease in the exit cost of civil marriage, the decrease in the exit
cost of religious marriage, and the decrease in the benefit of religious marriage.
The decrease in the exit cost of the civil divorce is meant to capture the shift to
no-fault divorce. I abstract from marital bargaining and the shift to unilateral
consent due to the implications of the Coase Theorem. Hence I ask of the model,
what is the response of the religious marriage rate relative to the civil marriage
rate to the decrease in the exit cost of civil marriage, what is its response to the
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decrease in the exit cost of religious marriage, and what is its response to the
decrease in the benefit of religious marriage?
In the model, there are two forms of marriage from which to choose, an
agent can marry civilly or an agent can marry both civilly and religiously. The
per period benefit to a civil marriage is a relationship-specific benefit b that is
drawn when a couple first meets, and the per period benefit B > 0 to a religious
marriage is exogenous and is the same for all religiously married couples. The
benefit b ∈ [0,∞) is drawn from the distribution H(·). The exit cost of a civil
marriage is normalized to 0, and the exit cost of a religious marriage is γ > 0.
One can think of γ as the cost of exiting a religious marriage relative to a civil
marriage. This cost is the same for all religiously married couples.
There is a unit mass of single agents with .5 men and .5 women. Initially,
each man meets a women with certainty, and they draw a b. Given this b, they
decide whether they will marry civilly or both civilly and religiously. Next period,
each couple receives their relevant per-period benefit and draws an outside option
σ that can be realized by both spouses if the marriage is dissolved. σ ∈ [0,∞)
is drawn from F (·). If the marriage is dissolved, they must pay the exit cost of
their relationship upfront and in full; and next period the two former spouses
both receive σ. After exiting a marriage, the game ends for the divorcees. If they
choose to remain married, then they enter the next period, receive their per-period
benefit and draw a new σ, and once again decide whether to remain married.
If the couple chooses to marry only civilly, then the value function of a
specific spouse is







Each spouse receives b. If today’s σ is smaller than the discounted value of re-
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maining married, that is, βVc, then tomorrow the spouses once again receive the
benefit of being married civilly and draw a new σ. If σ is larger than βVc, then
tomorrow each spouse receives the σ and exits the game. If the couple marries
both civilly and religiously, then the value function becomes






(s− γ)dF (σ). (2.2)
Today each spouse receives the relationship-specific b and the exogenous benefit
B. If σ is less than the discounted value of remaining both civilly and religiously
married plus the exit cost of the relationship, that is, βVr + γ, then the couple
remains engaged in both contracts and continues to tomorrow. If σ is greater
than the sum of βVr and γ, then the marriage is dissolved, both spouses pay γ
immediately, receive σ tomorrow and then exit the game.
Matouschek and Rasul[27] demonstrate that there exists a b such that all
couples that draw b ≥ b marry both civilly and religiously and all couples that
draw b ≤ b marry only civilly. Therefore, the proportion of couples that marry that
enter both contracts is 1−H(b), and the rate of religious marriage is [1−H(b)]1
2
.
Since all couples marry civilly in the model, the civil marriage rate is .5.
If the cost of civil divorce is lowered, this implies that the relative cost of
exiting a religious marriage has increased, that is, γ has increased. Given this
increase, I would like to examine what happens to the relative marriage rate in




differentiating equations (2.1) and (2.2), one finds that
db
dγ
> 0. This implies that
given an decrease in the cost of civil divorce and thus an increase in the relative
exit cost of religious marriage, the relative marriage rate decreases. In contrast
to this, if the cost of an annulment is decreased, the relative cost of exiting a
religious marriage has decreased, that is, γ decreases. This leads to an increase in
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the relative marriage rate. If the benefit of religious marriage is decreased, that
is, if B is decreased in the model, what happens to the relative marriage rate? To
answer this question one must know the value of
db
dB
. By once again implicitly
differentiating equations (2.1) and (2.2), one finds that
db
dB
< 0. Thus, a decrease
in B leads to a decrease in the relative marriage rate. The model predicts a
decrease in the relative marriage rate as a consequence of a decrease in the exit
cost of a civil marriage. If the dominant effect of religious reform is to decrease
the exit cost of a religious marriage, then the model predicts an increase in the
relative marriage rate; if the dominant effect is to decrease the benefit, the model
predicts a decrease in the relative marriage rate.
2.6 Empirical Implications
I test whether the relative marriage rate is correlated with civil divorce law
and Catholic reforms. The theory predicts
• the shift to unilateral consent will have no effect on the relative marriage
rate,
• the shift to no-fault will cause a decrease in the relative marriage rate,
• if the dominant effect of Catholic reforms is to decrease in the exit cost of
Catholic marriage, the relative marriage rate will increase, and
• if the dominant effect is to decrease in the benefit, the relative marriage rate
will decrease.
I perform these tests using a state-level panel of the Catholic marriage rate and of
the civil marriage rate. This panel is balanced and covers 49 states from 1960 to
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1992. Ellman and Lohr[11] do not list a no-fault reform data for Nevada so I do
not include it in any of the regressions to make my results more easily comparable
across different regressions. These data were obtained from the Official Catholic
Directory and from the Centers for Disease Control, respectively. Also, recall from
above that my preferred legal codings are the most restrictive of Friedberg[15] for
the shift to unilateral divorce and the most restrictive of Ellman and Lohr[11] for
the shift to no-fault divorce.
To estimate the relationship between the relative marriage rate and both
legal and religious reform, I use the following as my baseline specification:
relrates,t = αs + γt + β
vV aticant + β
uUnilaterals,t + β
nNofaults,t + εs,t (2.3)
α is a state fixed effect, and γ is a year fixed effect. relrate is the relative marriage
rate. Unilateral is an indicator variable that is 1 in the year of unilateral reform
and afterwards, and it is 0 otherwise; Nofault is an indicator variable that is 1 if
a no-fault divorce law regime is in place and 0 otherwise. Vatican is an indicator
variable that is 1 in 1965, the final year of Vatican II, and afterwards; otherwise,
it is 0.4 This equation is sufficiently general so as to eliminate the need to add
all relevant covariates that are time-independent within each state and that are
time-dependent but state-independent. An obvious deficiency is the lack of any
covariates that are both state- and time-dependent. I will address this concern
below by including time trends for each state.
My main results are presented in Table 2.4. In my baseline specification,
column (3), both the coefficient on Unilateral and the coefficient on No-Fault are
positive and insignificant. The coefficient on Vatican is negative and strongly
4We also substitute for the Vatican indicator, an indicator that is 1 in 1968 and afterwards,
and 0 otherwise. Humanae Vitae came into effect in 1968. Our results are not affected.
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Table 2.4: Main Estimation Results
Dependent variable: Relative Marriage Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unilateral .010 (.034) - .010 (.034) .018 (.029) .017 (.031)
No-Fault .033 (.032) - .033 (.032) .029 (.027) .029 (.031)
Vatican - -.281 (.033)** -.302 (.042)** -.070 (.030)* -.227 (.049)**
%Cath - - - - .172 (.141)
%Cath*Vatican - - - - -.408 (.131)**
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State trend, linear No No No Yes No
Adjusted R2 .738 .736 .738 .825 .756
Obs 1615 1615 1615 1615 1615
Notes: Sample covers 49 states (NV is dropped) from 1960 to 1992. Standard errors are in
parentheses. All standard errors are robust and adjusted for clustering. ** significant
at 1 percent level. * significant at 5 percent level.
significant. To attempt to control for time-changing covariates that vary across
states, I add a linear, state-specific time trend. The addition of this trend does
not affect the coefficient on Unilateral or on No-Fault ; with the linear trend, the
coefficient on Vatican rises from -.302 to -.07. The fact that the inclusion of time
trends decreases the explanatory power of Vatican coefficient is not surprising
since the effects of the reform of Catholic doctrine would most likely show up as
a decreasing propensity to marry religiously in any given state.
These results imply that the dominant effect of Catholic reform on a cou-
ple’s marital decision is to decrease their prospective benefit to entering into the
Catholic institution. Additionally, recall that the theory predicted a negative re-
sponse to the shift to no-fault divorce, but, empirically, this effect is not seen.
Thus, my results imply that changes in the exit cost of either the civil or Catholic
institution of marriage did not significantly effect the decision of those couples
choosing between them.
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A shortcoming of Vatican is that it does not depend upon both state and
time, only upon time. Thus, I would like to find an additional variable that cap-
tures the implementation of Catholic reforms but varies across both state and
time. It seems reasonable to assume that the benefit of Catholic marriage is de-
pendent upon the concentration of believers in that institution. To remedy this
shortcoming, I construct a variable that interacts the implementation of Catholic
reforms with the percentage of a state’s population that is Catholic. This inter-
action variable varies across state and time. The results from the inclusion of this
variable are presented in Table 2.4, column (5). Before Vatican II, the percentage
of a state’s population that was Catholic had a positive but insignificant effect
upon the relative marriage rate. This result is interesting in and of itself. But if
one looks to the coefficient on the interaction term, one sees that it is significant
and negative. In fact, it is so negative that after Vatican II, the more densely
occupied an area is by Catholics, the less likely are those Catholics to enter into
the Catholic institution of marriage. After Catholic reform, the total effect of
%Cath is -.235, and its standard error is .053.
I substitute every no-fault default coding mentioned above for my preferred
codings. These results are presented in Table 2.5. The only aberration is that the
coding of the Nakonezny et al.[29] produces a significant and negative coefficient,
but the validity of this coding has been seriously questioned by legal scholars[11].
2.7 Conclusion
I have presented data demonstrating the divergence in marital behavior
between the Catholic and civil population in the 1970s, and I have proposed and
modeled two possible explanations of this divergence, one based upon legal reforms
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Table 2.5: Results Using Alternative Codings for No-Fault Reform
Dependent variable: Relative Marriage Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unilateral .017 (.035) .009 (.039) .045 (.038) .015 (.036) .014 (.033) .010 (.034)
Brinig and Buckley -.009 (.040) – – – – –
Gruber – .001 (.032) – – – –
Nakonezny – – -.069 (.034)* – – –
Ellman and Lohr
Seperation – – – -.030 (.045) – –
Irretrievable
Breakdown – – – – .002 (.032) –
Property Division – – – – – .033 (.032)
Adjusted R2 .737 .728 .741 .737 .736 .738
Obs 1615 1549 1615 1615 1615 1615
See Notes for Table 2.4. All regressions include State and Year Fixed Effects and a dummy for Vatican II
reforms.
and one based upon religious reforms. Empirically, I find that the divergence in
marital behavior was caused by the reforms and proclamations of the Catholic
Church during the 1960s, including both Vatican II and Humanae Vitae. These
caused a decrease in the benefit to engaging in a Catholic marriage, thus causing
a shift from Catholic marriage to civil marriage.
In the simple theory presented in this essay, agents choose between mar-
rying civilly or both civilly and religiously simultaneously by a comparison of the
relative value of the two institutions of marriage. This theory is the first step
in the construction of a more complete model that can fully explain marital be-
havior. I build upon the previous economics literature modeling marriage, for
example, Rasul[33] and Matouschek and Rasul[27], and formally reimagine mar-
riage as a set of two contracts that a marrying couple can enter simultaneously.
This modification is essential in understanding and predicting the behavior of in-
dividuals marrying due to the fact that individuals are motivated by religious and
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social costs and benefits in addition to financial and legal costs and benefits when
choosing if, how, and when to enter a marriage.
This theory is able to explain the changes in marital behavior that are
responses to changes in the benefit of the two marital institutions but not those
that are responses to changes in their exit cost. The model predicts that agents
respond to changes in the exit cost of both institutions of marriage, but I find
no empirical evidence that this is the case. For example, empirically the shift to
no-fault reform does not significantly affect the relative marriage rate; whereas,
the model predicts that it should.
The explanatory power of the model presented here can be increased in a
few ways. The first is by explicitly modeling the benefit and cost to each individual
institution of marriage. The present model can only speak of relative benefits and
costs. Additionally, if I were explicitly to model these benefits and costs, then
a social complementarity that affects both the benefit and cost of the religious
contract could be included. This would mean that the actions of all agents in
the model would have an impact on a specific agent’s personal benefit and cost
of marrying religiously, for example, the benefit of religious marriage may be
increasing in the number of Catholics. My empirical work supports the inclusion
of this complementarity. Secondly, the agents in the model should be allowed to
remain single. This would allow me to examine the civil and Catholic marriage
rates independent of one another and make predictions regarding their absolute
movements, unlike in the present model that allows only statement concerning
relative movements. Finally, the decision of singles should be modeled in two
ways, one in which they take into account changes in exit costs and one in which
they do not. Then a comparison could be made between the two to discover which
produces more accurate predictions.
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Further research will formally model this modified theory, develop testable
predictions from this model, and test them on a variety of data sets. Additionally,
it would be interesting to investigate the degree to which the composition of
Catholic marriage, that is, ”pure” versus interfaith marriage, has responded to
Catholic doctrinal change and US legal reform and what effect these compositional




A Theoretical Model of Marriage as a Set of
Two Institutions
3.1 Introduction
In the United States during the mid to late 1970s, the marital behavior
of Catholics changed dramatically relative to the marital behavior of the total
population. The Catholic marriage rate, that is, the number of Catholic marriages
consecrated annually per 1000 Catholics, fell approximately 20 percent relative to
the civil marriage rate, that is, the number of civil marriages performed annually
per l000 individuals. This relative decrease was the result of an increase of 2
percent in the civil marriage rate and a decrease of 17 percent in the Catholic
marriage rate. What makes this curious is that both before and after this period,
the two marriage rates moved in tandem.1 The goal of this essay is to explain the
absolute movement of both the Catholic and civil marriage rates in the United
States during this time period.
I hypothesize that both the increase of the civil marriage rate and the
decrease of the Catholic marriage rate were due to a negative reaction among
Catholics to Vatican II and Humanae Vitae, an encyclical that upheld the tra-
ditional sexual morality of the Catholic Church. This negative reaction resulted
in the benefit of a Catholic marriage being decreased. In the previous chapter in
1For a detailed discussion of this data, refer to section 2.4.
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which I studied the relative movement of the Catholic marriage rate[18], I pro-
posed and tested two potential explanations of the relative decrease in the Catholic
marriage rate: the reform of civil divorce law, and the Catholic reforms and de-
crees of the 1960s (Vatican II and Humanae Vitae). I imagined Catholic reforms
potentially lowering both the benefit and the exit cost of a Catholic marriage.
Empirically, I found that civil reform had no effect on relative marital behavior,
that the decrease in the relative marriage rate, that is, the Catholic marriage rate
divided by the civil marriage rate, was due to the Catholic reforms and decrees,
and that the effect of Catholic reform was to decrease the benefit of a Catholic
marriage. This chapter follows the previous one and tests whether my findings
regarding the relative marriage rate are robust enough to explain the absolute
movement of both marriage rates.
To test the validity of my hypothesis, I model marriage as a set of two
contracts, one civil and one religious. I have chosen to model marriage in this
manner because these two contracts have distinct benefits and costs and because
entering one contract does not imply that an individual has entered the other.
Given I am treating marriage as a set of two institutions, or contracts, the ques-
tion then arises as to why changes in one institution would affect the behavior
related to the other institution. What causes the interconnectedness of the two in-
stitutions? The interconnectedness arises because a couple is potentially entering
two contracts for one arrangement, that is, a couple may enter both a civil and
Catholic marriage contract simultaneously for a single marriage. In the model, a
couple makes this choice based upon a comparison of the cost and benefit of each
contract. Whereas the benefit and cost of a civil marriage do not depend upon
anything other than the legal system, I model the benefit and cost of a Catholic
marriage as depending upon the concentration of Catholics. In the model, the
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driving force behind the change in marital behavior is a shift in the structure of
the above social complementarity. After religious reform, the benefit and cost of a
Catholic marriage depends less strongly upon the concentration of Catholics than
before reform. In Chapter 2, I presented empirical evidence of the existence of
this complementarity and its enervation after religious reform.
The model I construct has both a short-run and long-run equilibrium.
The short-run equilibrium is the equilibrium in which the population parameters
(the number of each type of agent) in the model is held constant; the long-run
equilibrium is the equilibrium in which these parameters are allowed to vary in
response to structural changes in the model. In this chapter, I focus on the short-
run effects of religious reform because of the constancy of the demographics of US
Catholics relative to the general US population during this period, and I leave the
examination of the long-run effects for future work.
In the specific version of the model that I examine, religious reform de-
creases the benefit of a religious marriage. The model predicts that this reform
will lead to a decrease in the religious marriage rate. The model predicts that
religious reform will also affect the civil marriage rate. Reform leads to two con-
trary effects in the civil marriage rate. Religious believers choose to marry civilly
earlier in life because their option value of remaining single has decreased after
religious reform, but non-believers choose to marry later in life since they can be
more selective when choosing a spouse due to believers being less selective. In the
model, the first effect outweighs the second, and the civil marriage rate increases
after religious reform. The model also speaks to the effect of reform on the inter-
faith marriage rate; it predicts that the interfaith marriage rate will increase after
reform. The first two predictions match the data. I find that after Catholic re-
forms, the Catholic marriage rate decreases and the civil marriage rate increases.
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The empirical work of numerous researchers is mixed regarding the response of
the interfaith marriage rate to the social changes of the 1960s.
To my knowledge, marriage has not been studied formally and empirically
as a set of two institutions. Numerous researchers have examined the relationship
between civil divorce law and civil divorce rates. Among others, Friedberg[15]
and Wolfers[41] have examined this relationship. Two of the very few papers that
examine the effect of divorce law reforms on the civil marriage rate are Rasul[33]
and Matouschek and Rasul[27]. These studies fail to differentiate between the
two institutions of marriage; and, as such, they fail to fully specify the motives
individuals have for entering or exiting a given marital arrangement. Due to this,
they are unable to explain or predict behavior that arises from an individual’s
choosing between the two institutions of marriage. Specifically, they are unable
to explain the facts presented in this essay. Therefore, this distinction should be
made not only for the sake of clarity and completeness but also to increase the
explanatory power of the theory.
An additional reason for distinguishing between civil and Catholic mar-
riage is that the Catholic marriage rate could be a better proxy for the strength
of the social institution of marriage. The ultimate measure of the previous re-
search examining civil marriage and divorce rates is its utility in assessing the
strength and the factors affecting the strength of the social institution of mar-
riage. The strength of the institution is directly related to and supported by the
strength of the norms that direct individuals to marry and in which manner to
marry and those that stigmatize divorce. Those entering into a religious marriage
are likely more serious about the commitment they are undertaking than those
entering only a civil marriage due to the added severity religion incorporates into
marriage and are more strongly guided by social customs and norms. Due to this,
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the Catholic marriage rate is potentially a better indicator of the strength of the
norms supporting marriage and stigmatizing divorce and therefore the strength
of the institution of marriage. Lastly, examining the interaction of the civil insti-
tution and the religious institution of marriage can help one to better understand
generally how legal and social institutions interact and affect one another. For
example, researchers can better understand when the two types of institutions are
complements and when they are substitutes. These types of interactions should
be better understood to ensure stable social institutions with the aim of increasing
overall social welfare.
I contribute to the theoretical literature with my novel recasting of marriage
as a set of two contracts and my study of the interaction between these two
contracts. I know of no other papers that formally consider marriage as a ’dual’
contract. In fact, even formally considering marriage as a contract is relatively new
to the economics literature. Moreover, I contribute to the empirical literature by
studying the effect of both the reform of civil divorce law and of Catholic doctrine
on the civil and Catholic marriage rates simultaneously.
3.2 General Theory
I construct a search model that incorporates the agent’s marriage and di-
vorce decisions. My model follows the work of other economists that have used
search models to study marital formation and dissolution, for example, [33] and
[27], but my work greatly extends theirs by including two institutions of marriage
within the theory. In the model, there are two types of marriage, civil and re-
ligious. The agents may either be married civilly or both civilly and religiously.
What distinguishes these two types of marriage are their respective entry costs,
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exit costs, and marital benefits. The civil institution has no entry costs associated
with it, and its benefit is mc. There is a cost to exit a civil marriage; this cost is
ξ and must be paid immediately upon exit. There is an entry cost γ associated
with the religious institution. The benefit to being in both a civil and religious
marriage is mr = mc(1 + Σ(Ω, ρ)). The added benefit to being in both a civil and
religious marriage, Σ(Ω, ρ), depends upon the number of believers in the world,
Ω, and whether there has been religious reform, ρ. If there has been reform, ρ is
1; otherwise, it is 0. As ρ changes from 0 to 1, Σ decreases for all values of Ω.
This structure of the complementarity is supported by empirical evidence[18]. If
a couple is both civilly and religiously married, they can exit the civil institution
alone and pay ξ and Γ(Ω, ρ). In this case, Γ(Ω, ρ) can thought of as the social
stigma associated with exiting a marriage. If the couple exits both institutions,
they must pay the above costs plus ξr, the cost of an annulment. Any agent that
chooses not to receive a religious annulment is unable to marry religiously in the
future.
The model is populated by an unit measure of agents, .5 women and .5
men. The agents are heterogeneous and identified by three variables, M, θ, and ψ.
M is an agent’s marital capital stock. This capital stock is used in the production
of a marriage benefit, mθ. θ is the agent’s marital status. An agent can either be
single (s), engaged in a civil marriage (c), or engaged in both a civil and a religious
marriage (r). ψ is an agent’s belief status. If ψ is 1, then an agent is a believer
in the religious institution of marriage. This implies that an agent can enter a
religious marriage. If ψ is 0, then an agent is a non-believer and cannot enter a
religious marriage. At the end of every period, κ agents die. κ is spread evenly
across all agent types. At the beginning of every period, the κ agents that died
yesterday are replaced with new-born single agents, φ of which are believers. The
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number of single agents is λ, which is composed of single believers, λ1, and single
non-believers, λ0. Thus, λ = λ1 + λ0. The number of married agents is µ, which
is composed of married believers, µ1, and married non-believers, µ0. λ + µ = 1.
Additionally, the total number of believers is Ω = λ1 + µ1.
The timing of each period for single agents is as follows. There are λ1 be-
lievers and λ0 non-believers. The period begins, and a single male agent with state
(ψi) meets a single female agent j with state (ψj) with certainty. Agent i meets
a single believer with probability λ1 and a single non-believer with probability
λ0. This couple draws a couple-specific marital stock, Mij, from an unconditional
distribution G(·). Given Mij, the couple must then choose whether to marry. If
ψi + ψj = 2, that is, both are believers, then the couple’s options are to remain
single, to enter a civil marriage, or to enter both a civil and religious marriage. If
ψi + ψj < 2, the couple’s options are to remain single or to enter a civil marriage.
If an interfaith couple, that is, ψi +ψj = 1, chooses to enter a civil marriage, both
agents become non-believers. In any of the above circumstances, if either agent
chooses to remain single, then the couple splits apart, and both agents return to
their respective singles pool.
The timing of each period for married agents is as follows. If an agent is
only civilly married, then he enters the period with state (M, ψ). First, he receives
mc(M), the benefit to a civil marriage; then he receives a new M ′ that is drawn
from a conditional distribution F (·|M) that has the property dF (·|M)
dM
< 0. After
receiving M ′, the agent decides whether to divorce his spouse or remain married.
If he chooses to divorce, the agent must pay the exit cost of a civil divorce, ξ,
immediately; and he returns to the singles pool. If an agent is both civilly and
religiously married, he enters the period with state (M, 1). ψ is equal to 1 because
an agent must be a believer to enter a religious marriage. The agent receives his
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marital benefit mr(M), and then he draws a M ′ from the conditional distribution
F (·|M) (the same distribution the civilly married agents use). Given M ′, the
agent decides whether to obtain a civil divorce but no religious annulment, to
obtain both a civil divorce and a religious annulment, or remain both civilly and
religiously married. If he chooses to divorce but not annul, he must pay the cost
of civil divorce, ξ, plus a social cost of exiting the religious marriage, Γ(Ω, ρ), and
becomes a non-believer. This agent can no longer marry religiously. If he chooses
to divorce and to annul, he must pay the cost of a annulment, ξr, in addition to ξ
and Γ(Ω, ρ). If the agent receives an annulment, he remains a believer and is able
to marry religiously in the future. Thus, an agent would only receive an annulment
if he believed the added cost ξr was outweighed by the option value of marrying
religiously. Notice that the above structure guarantees that both spouses engaged
in a marriage are identical so there is no need to distinguish between spouses.
I first describe the value functions for single agents. With certainty a single
male agent i that is a believer meets a single female agent j. With probability λ1,
agent j will be a believer; and with probability λ0, she will be a non-believer. The
couple then draws a couple-specific marital capital stock Mij and must decide if
and how to marry. If ψj = 1, the couple may marry religiously. If ψj = 0, they
only have the option of a civil marriage. After entering the period and meeting
a potential spouse, agent i’s value function is Vs(ψi, ψj). Thus, when a believer i
meets a potential spouse j who is also a believer, his value function is
Vs(1, 1) = (1− κ)βE[max{Vc(M, 1), Vr(M, 1)− γ, Vs(1)}].
Vc(M, 1) is the value for i of entering a civil marriage with j, and Vr(M, 1) is the
value of entering into both a civil and religious marriage with j. γ is a one-time
fixed cost that an agent must pay if he chooses to enter both a civil and religious
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marriage. Vs(1) is the expected value to i of remaining single (described below).
If believer i meets a non-believer j, his value function is
Vs(1, 0) = (1− κ)βE[max{Vc(M, 0), Vs(1)}].
Vc(M, 0) is the value for a believer of entering into a civil marriage with a non-
believer. Notice that ψi becomes 0, that is, agent i becomes a non-believer. Once
again, Vs(1) is the expected value for i of remaining single. Given the above two
equations, the expected value of being single for a believer when he first enters
into the period and has not yet meet a potential spouse is
EVs(1) = λ1Vs(1, 1) + λ0Vs(1, 0) (3.1)
where λ1 is the number of believers and λ0 is the number of non-believers.
When a single male agent i is a non-believer, his marital options do not
depend upon his potential spouse’s ψj. If i meets a believer j, his value function
is
Vs(0, 1) = (1− κ)βE[max{Vc(M, 0), Vs(0)}]
with Vc(M, 0) the value of marrying j civilly and Vs(0) is the expected value of
remaining single (described below). If i meets another non-believer j, his value
function is
Vs(0, 0) = (1− κ)βE[max{Vc(M, 0), Vs(0)}]
Given these two equations, the expected value of being single for i when he first
enters into the period but has not yet meet a potential spouse is
EVs(0) = λ1Vs(0, 1) + λ0Vs(0, 0) (3.2)
where λ1 is the number of believers and λ0 is the number of non-believers.
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An agent that is civilly married comes into the period with the state (M, ψ).
The value function of an individual in a civil marriage is
Vc(M, ψ) = u(m
c) + E[max{−ξ + (1− κ)βVs(ψ), (1− κ)βVc(M ′, ψ)}|M ] (3.3)
The agent first receives his marital benefit mc. The agent values this benefit
with the utility function u(·). This function is the same across all agents. After
drawing M ′, the agent must decide whether to divorce or remain married. Vs(ψ)
is the value of receiving a civil divorce. This value is discounted because it is not
received until next period. ξ is the cost of a civil divorce; it must be paid this
period. Vc(M
′, ψ) is the value of remaining in a civil marriage. Note that ψ does
not take on a specific value here because the two spouses in a civil marriage may
be both believers or both non-believers.
An agent that is engaged in both a civil and religious marriage comes into
the period with the state (M, 1). ψ is equal to 1 because an agent must be a
believer to enter a religious marriage. His value function is
Vr(M, 1) = u(m
r) + E[max{−(ξ + Γ(Ω, ρ)) + (1− κ)βVs(0),
− (ξ + ξr + Γ(Ω, ρ)) + (1− κ)βVs(1), (1− κ)βVr(M ′, 1)}|M ]
(3.4)
The agent receives the marital benefit mr and values it with u(·). He then draws
a M ′ and decides whether to divorce, to divorce and to annul, or to remain civilly
and religiously married. Vs(0) is the value of receiving a civil divorce but not a
religious annulment. Notice that the agent becomes a non-believer, that is, ψ = 0.
This is meant to mimic the fact that divorced Catholics are unable to remarry
within the Catholic Church if they are not granted an annulment. This value is
discounted because it is received next period. The agent must pay the associated
costs ξ + Γ(Ω, ρ) this period. Γ(Ω, ρ) is a social cost related to exiting a religious
marriage. It can be thought of as a social stigma. This cost is dependent upon
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the number of believers and also upon whether there has be religious reform.
Vs(1) is the value of receiving both a civil divorce and a religious annulment; this
value is received tomorrow. The associated costs that must be paid today are
ξ + ξr +Γ(Ω, ρ). ξr is the cost of filing for and receiving an annulment. If a couple
chooses remain in both institutions, they receive Vr(M
′, 1) tomorrow.
3.3 Specific Theory
In this section, I make one major, simplifying assumption and then solve
the model. I assume that there is no uncertainty within a marriage. Once two
agents decide to marry, they receive the same M in perpetuity. I do this for two
reasons. The first is that the main uncertainty I am interested in examining is the
uncertainty related to religious reform, and therefore marital uncertainty adds an
unnecessary, complicating factor. The second reason is that in the specific model
that results from this assumption, single agents do not take into account the
changes in the exit cost of the either the civil or religious institution of marriage.
I later present evidence that this is the case.
I now solve for the specific values of Vc(M, 0), Vc(M, 1), and Vr(M, 1). To
simplify the algebra, I assume the following. u(·) is linear. Σ(Ω, ρ) is Π(ρ)Ω with
Π(ρ) > 0 and
dΠ
dρ
< 0. mc = M , and mr = M(1 + Σ(Ω, ρ)). To solve for the
value functions, one must know whether an agent would ever exit a marriage of
any type. It is the case that an agent never exits a marriage, irrelevant of what
type of marriage in which he is engaged. To prove this, the following is useful.
Lemma 1. Vs(1) ≥ Vs(0)
Proof. By comparing equations (3.1) and (3.2), one can see that the only essen-
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tial difference in the value between the two is due to the added option of religious
marriage in (3.1), that is, the addition of Vr(M, 1) − γ. If I remove this option,
Vc(M, 1) = Vc(M, 0) and Vs(1) = Vs(0). By adding the option of religious mar-
riage, the value of Vs(1) can only be increased or remain the same; this addition
could never lower the its value because if Vr(M, 1) − γ < max{Vc(M, 1), Vs(1)},
the agent would never choose it.
Lemma 2. Given no uncertainty in marriage, no agent exits a civil marriage.
Proof. There are three cases to consider here, (1) two believers engaged in a civil
marriage, (2) two non-believers engaged in a civil marriage, and (3) two non-
believers, one of which was previously a believer, engaged in a civil marriage.
(1) Vc(M, 1) ≥ max{Vr(M, 1) − γ, Vs(1)} ⇒ Vc(M, 1) ≥ Vs(1) ⇒ (1 −
κ)βVc(M, 1) ≥ (1− κ)βVs(1)− ξ ⇒ never exits a civil marriage.
(2) Vc(M, 0) ≥ Vs(0) ⇒ (1 − κ)βVc(M, 0) ≥ (1 − κ)βVs(0) − ξ ⇒ never
exits a civil marriage.
(3) In this case, there are two perspectives to consider, that of the believer
and that of the non-believer. Recall that when the believer marries a non-believer,
he himself becomes a non-believer. Thus, from the perspective of the non-believer,
this case is the same as case 2; so she never exits the civil marriage. What then
does the believer do? Since he has entered into a civil marriage, Vc(M, 0) ≥ Vs(1).
By Lemma 1, Vc(M, 0) ≥ Vs(0). Thus, (1− κ)βVc(M, 0) ≥ (1− κ)βVs(0)− ξ, and
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he never exits a civil marriage.
Lemma 3. Given no uncertainty in marriage, no agent exits a religious marriage.
Proof. Since an agent must be a believer to enter into a religious marriage, both
spouses in a religious marriage must be believers. For both spouses, it must be the
case that Vr(M, 1) − γ ≥ max{Vc(M, 1), Vs(1)}. Therefore, (1 − κ)βVr(M, 1) ≥
(1 − κ)βVs(1) − (ξ + ξr + Γ(Ω, ρ)). Neither spouses chooses to both divorce and
annul. By Lemma 1, Vr(M, 1) ≥ Vs(1) ≥ Vs(0). Therefore, (1 − κ)βVr(M, 1) ≥
(1 − κ)βVs(0) − (ξ + Γ(Ω, ρ)). Neither spouse chooses to divorce. Thus, neither
spouse chooses to exit a religious marriage.
With these results, one is now able to calculate the specific values of
Vc(M, 0), Vc(M, 1), and Vr(M, 1). Since once agents are married they choose




1− (1− κ)β (3.5)
Vc(M, 1) =
M
1− (1− κ)β (3.6)
Vr(M, 1) =
M(1 + Σ(Ω, ρ))
1− (1− κ)β (3.7)
Additionally, as is typically the case in search models, there exists optimal
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cut-off points. Defining E[a,b]x as
∫
[a,b]
xdG(x), (3.1) and (3.2) can be rewritten as
Vs(1) = λ1(1− κ)βE[M , M1][Vs(1)] + λ1(1− κ)βE[M1, M1][Vc(M, 1)]
+λ1(1− κ)βE[M1, M ][Vr(M, 1)− γ] + λ0(1− κ)βE[M , M10][Vs(1)]
+λ0(1− κ)βE[M10, M ][Vc(M, 0)],
Vs(0) = λ0(1− κ)βE[M , M0][Vs(0)] + λ0(1− κ)βE[M0, M ][Vc(M, 0)]
+λ1(1− κ)βE[M , M10][Vs(0)] + λ1(1− κ)βE[M10, M ][Vc(M, 0)]
M and M are the upper and lower bounds of the support of M . If two believers
meet and draw an M below M1, they return to the singles’ pool. If they draw an
M above M1 and below M1, they choose to enter into a civil marriage. If they
draw an M above M1, they enter into a religious marriage. If a believer meets a
non-believer and they draw a M above M10, the believer chooses to enter a civil
marriage with the non-believer; otherwise, he chooses to remain single. When a
non-believer meets a single non-believer and the couple draws an M above M0,
she chooses to marry civilly; otherwise, she chooses to remain single. When a
non-believer meets a single believer and the couple draws an M above M10, the
two marry civilly. The reason the cut-off is M10 and not M0 in this case is due
to the fact that that M10 ≥ M0. Thus, the believer is the limiting factor in an
interfaith marital decision.
Since neither Vs(1) nor Vs(0) depend upon M , Vs(1) and Vs(0) can be
factored out and solved for explicitly,
Vs(0) =
λ0(1− κ)βE[M0, M ][Vc(M, 0)] + λ1(1− κ)βE[M10, M ][Vc(M, 0)]
1− λ0(1− κ)βG(M0)− λ1(1− κ)βG(M10)
(3.8)
Vs(1) = {λ1(1− κ)βE[M1, M1][Vc(M, 1)] + λ1(1− κ)βE[M1, M ][Vr(M, 1)− γ]
+ λ0(1− κ)βE[M10, M ][Vc(M, 0)]}
1




Lemma 4. If γ is sufficiently large, M1 > M1.
Proof. Note that V (M1, r, 1)− γ = V (M1, c, 1) and thus M1(1 + Σ(Ω, ρ))
1− (1− κ)β − γ =
M1
1− (1− κ)β . This implies M1 = γ
1− (1− κ)β
Σ(Ω, ρ)
. M1 is increasing in γ. M1
is determined by Vc(M1, 1) = Vs(1). Additionally, Vs(1) is decreasing in γ and
Vc(M, 1) is increasing in M . Thus, an increase in γ causes a decrease in M1.
Throughout the remainder of the essay, I assume that γ is sufficiently large
so that M1 > M1. With the value functions and optimal cut-offs now specified,
one is able to calculate the various marriage rates. The religious marriage rate,




.5(λ1λ0 + λ0λ1)(1−G(M10)) (3.11)
.5λ0λ0(1−G(M0)) + .5(λ1λ0 + λ0λ1)(1−G(M10)) + .5λ1λ1(1−G(M1)).
(3.12)
The religious marriage rate is calculated as the number of couples composed of two
believers (.5λ21) that draw an M ≥ M1 divided by the total number of believers,
λ1+µ1. The interfaith marriage rate is the number of couples composed of either a
male believer and female non-believer (.5λ1λ0) or a male non-believer and female
believer (.5λ0λ1) that draw an M ≥ M10. The civil marriage rate is the sum of
three distinct components. The first is the number of couples composed of two
non-believers (.5λ20) that draw an M ≥ M0. The second is the interfaith marriage
rate, and the third is the number of couples composed of two believers (.5λ21) that
draw an M such that M ≥ M1. These last two quantities are divided by the total
population, which is equal to 1, to arrive at the respective rates.
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I am interested in solving for a stationary equilibrium of this model. This
model has two types of stationary equilibria, short-run and long-run. In the short-
run, the population parameters are fixed; and the model is solved for M1, M1,
M10, and M0 using
Vc(M1, 1) = Vs(1) (3.13)
Vc(M1, 1) = Vr(M1, 1)− γ (3.14)
Vc(M10, 0) = Vs(1) (3.15)
Vc(M0, 0) = Vs(0) (3.16)
In the long-run, the population parameters are to free to vary. There are four
population parameters: λ0 (the number of single non-believers), λ1 (the number
of single believers), µ0 (the number of married non-believers), and µ1 (the number
of married believers). Thus, four more equations are required to solve a long-run
equilibrium. In a long-run, stationary equilibrium, it must be the case that the
inflow into each of these segments of the population is equal to the outflow. This
is represented by the following four equations:
φκ = λ21(1−G(M1)) + λ1λ0(1−G(M10)) + λ1κ (3.17)
(1− φ)κ = λ20(1−G(M0)) + λ1λ0(1−G(M10)) + λ0κ (3.18)
λ21(1−G(M1)) = µ1κ (3.19)
2λ1λ0(1−G(M10)) + λ20(1−G(M0)) = µ0κ (3.20)
Equations (3.17) and (3.18) imply that φ > λ1 > 0 and (1 − φ) > λ0 > 0. This
in turn implies that µ1, µ0 > 0 and have some positive upper bound. Thus, there
does not exist an equilibrium in which there are no believers. In fact, there is




I now study the short-run implications of the theory. I focus on the short-
run for two reasons. First of all, the length of time I am studying seems insufficient
for large scale responses in the Catholic or general US population to have occurred.
Secondly, the empirical evidence does not point to a shift in Catholic demographics
relative to general US demographics. Thus, I believe the most salient equilibrium
is the short-run equilibrium.
In the short-run, the population parameters, that is, λ0, λ1, µ0, and µ1, are
held fixed and not allowed to vary in response to structural changes in the model.
With these parameters fixed, I would like to know what happens to the religious,
interfaith, and civil marriage rates after the institution of religious reform. This
requires one to examine how religious reforms affect the cut-off points, M1, M1,
M10, and M0.
When religious reform is implemented, Σ(Ω, ρ) is lowered; this is due to
the fact that Π(ρ) is decreased. To understand how this change affects the various
marriage rates, one must study the equilibrium conditions (3.13)-(3.16) to discover
how the cut-off values vary in response to a change in Π(ρ).
Theorem 1. Given that G(·) is the uniform distribution with support [0, b]. After
religious reform, (1) M1 decreases, (2) M10 decreases, (3) M1 increases, and (4)
M0 increases.
Proof. To prove this, one must totally differentiate (3.13) - (3.16) with respect to
the four cut-off points and Π. First, notice that (3.13) and (3.15) are redundant;
therefore, M1 = M10.
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(1) & (2) If one totally differentiates equation (3.13) and gathers the non-











The numerator can easily be shown to be positive. The denominator is also
positive. This must the case because at M1, Vc(M, 1) intersects Vs(1) from below.
Thus, as Π decreases, M1 and M10 also decrease.






Thus, as Π decreases, M1 increases.
(4) Religious reform does not have a direct effect on M0; the effect of reform















The denominator is positive. This must the case because at M0, Vc(M, 0) inter-
sects Vs(0) from below. Given that G(M) is the uniform distribution with support





. In equilibrium, this is equal to
1 − M1
M0





Theorem 2. After religious reform (1) the religious marriage rate decreases, (2)
the interfaith marriage rate increases, and (3) the civil marriage rate could either
increase or decrease.
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From Theorem 1, M1 increases after religion reform. Since G(·) is increasing in
M, the religious marriage rate decreases. The interfaith marriage rate is
.5(λ1λ0 + λ0λ1)(1−G(M10)).
From Theorem 1, M10 decreases after religious reform; thus, the interfaith rate
increases. The civil marriage rate is
.5λ0λ0(1−G(M0)) + .5(λ1λ0 + λ0λ1)(1−G(M10)) + .5λ1λ1(1−G(M1))
From Theorem 1, after religious reform M0 increases, and M10 = M1 decreases.
Thus, after reform, there are two contrary effects on the civil rate. First, consider
the second and third terms of the civil rate. Both of these terms increase after
reform because believers are now less selective when choosing a marriage partner.
Second, consider the first term; this term decreases after reform. It decreases
because non-believers become more selective since believers are now less selective
in their marriage partners.
Lemma 5. Given that G(·) is the uniform distribution with support [0, b] and that
γ (the entry cost of a religious marriage) is a linear function of b, then the four
cut-off points are linear functions of b.
Proof. To prove this, assume that the cut-off points are linear functions of b and
substitute these functions into equations (3.13)-(3.16).
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Theorem 3. Given that G(·) is the uniform distribution with support [0, b] and
that γ (the entry cost of a religious marriage) is a linear function of b, the civil
marriage rate increases after religious reform.
Proof. By Lemma 5, one knows that the cut-off points are linear functions of b:
M0 = Ab
M10 = M1 = Bb
M1 = Cb
γ = Db.
























them into the above equation. If one does this, one finds that the civil rate will
increase after religious reform if
λ20(1− κ)β(B − A)
(1− κ)β(λ0A + λ1B)− 1 − (λ0 + λ1) < 0.
The denominator of the first term is always negative. This is the case since A and
B are both < 1. The numerator of the first term is non-negative. From Lemma 1
and equations (3.15) and (3.16), M1 ≥ M0. Thus, B ≥ A.
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3.5 Empirical Implications
I test the following predictions, following the Catholic reforms of the mid
to late 1960s,
• the civil marriage rate increases
• the Catholic marriage rate decreases, and
• the interfaith marriage rate increases.
I test the first two predictions using a state-level panel of the Catholic marriage
rate and of the civil marriage rate. These data were obtained from the Official
Catholic Directory (OCD) and from the Centers for Disease Control, respectively.
This panel is balanced and covers 49 states from 1960 to 1992. Ellman and
Lohr[11], whose no-fault coding I use, do not list a no-fault reform data for Nevada
so I do not include it in any of the regressions to make my results more easily
comparable across different regressions. I use Friedberg’s[15] coding for the shift
to unilateral consent. Due to the lack of a decent time series in the OCD, I turn
to evidence presented in the sociology literature to test the last prediction.
Also, recall that I made a major simplifying assumption in the model, that
there is no uncertainty after marrying. This does not mean that there actually
is no uncertainty after marrying, only that single individuals make their marital
decisions as if that were the case. In other words, single agents make their marital
decision under the assumption that if they marry, they will remain married forever.
The main implication of this assumption is that changes in the exit cost of either
marital institution will not affect the marital decision of a single agent. If my
assumption is correct, then
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• the reform of civil divorce law will have no effect on either the civil or
Catholic marriage rate, and
• the reform of Catholic doctrine will have a non-positive effect on the Catholic
marriage rate.
I am able to test the validity of this assumption, based upon its implications, with
the above-mentioned panel.
To estimate the relationship among the civil marriage rate, the Catholic
marriage rate, and legal and religious reform, I use the following equations as my
baseline specifications:
civrates,t = αs + γt + β
vV aticant + β
uUnilaterals,t + β
nNofaults,t
+ βcCathpers,t + β
vpV atpers,t + β
cathCathrates,t + εs,t,
(3.21)
cathrates,t = αs + γt + β
vV aticant + β
uUnilaterals,t + β
nNofaults,t
+ βcCathpers,t + β
vpV atpers,t + β
civCivrates,t + εs,t,
(3.22)
civrate is the civil marriage rate, and cathrate is the Catholic marriage rate. α is
a state fixed effect, and γ is a year fixed effect. Unilateral is an indicator variable
that is 1 in the year of unilateral reform and afterwards, and it is 0 otherwise;
Nofault is an indicator variable that is 1 if a no-fault divorce law regime is in place
and 0 otherwise. Vatican is an indicator variable that is 1 in 1965, the ending
year of Vatican II, and afterwards; otherwise, it is 0.2 Catper is the percentage
of Catholics in a given state in a given year. Finally, Vatper is an interaction of
Vatican and Catper. Vatper is meant to capture the social complementarity that
I modeled as Σ(Ω, ρ). These equations are sufficiently general to eliminate the
2I also substitute for the Vatican indicator, an indicator that is 1 in 1968 and afterwards,
and 0 otherwise. Humanae Vitae came into effect in 1968. My results are not affected.
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Table 3.1: Reform Effects on the Civil Marriage Rate
Dependent variable: Civil Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Unilateral -.323 (.366) - -.330 (.363)
No-fault .279 (.358) - .279 (.358)
Vatican - 1.81 (.386)** 1.81 (.361)**
% Cath -.005 (.279) -.411 (1.38) -.538 (1.35)
% Cath * Vatican - .433 (1.28) .540 (1.24)
Cathrate .197 (.078)* .219 (.075)** .203 (.081)*
Adj R2 .806 .805 .806
Obs 1615 1615 1615
Notes: Sample covers 49 states (NV is dropped) from 1960
to 1992. Standard errors are in parentheses. All standard
errors are robust and adjusted for clustering. ** significant
at 1 percent level. * significant at 5 percent level. All
regressions include State and Year Fixed Effects.
need to add all covariates that are time-independent within each state or that are
time-dependent but state-independent.
The results of the above two regressions are presented in Table 3.1, column
(3) and Table 3.2, column (3). The sign and significance of the coefficients in
Table 3.1 confirm our predictions. Following Catholic reform, the civil marriage
rate increases as predicted by the model. The coefficient on Vatican is equal to
1.81 and is statistically significant. The total effect of Catholic reform on the
civil rate is 1.91 with a standard error of .238 evaluated at the mean of %Cath, is
1.82 with a standard error of .337 at the mean less one standard deviation, and
is 2.01 with a standard error of .306 at the mean plus one standard deviation.
Additionally, the civil marriage rate does not response to changes in civil divorce
law, either no-fault or unilateral reform. These facts validate my assumption that
single agents do not in fact take into account changes in the exit cost of marital
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Table 3.2: Reform Effects on the Catholic Marriage Rate
Dependent variable: Catholic Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Unilateral -.214 (.259) - -.165 (.257)
No-fault .658 (.212)** - .644 (.213)**
Vatican - 2.28 (.31)** -1.55 (.329)**
% Cath 1.99 (.464)** 1.26 (.949) 1.19 (.910)
% Cath * Vatican - -3.28 (.797)** -3.16 (.790)**
Civrate .144 (.053)** .159 (.052)** .144 (.052)**
Adj R2 .775 .774 .781
Obs 1615 1615 1615
See Notes for Table 3.1.
contracts when making their marital decision.
In Table 3.2, the coefficient on Vatican is -1.55 and significant. The total
effect of Vatican is -2.19 with a standard error of .276 evaluated at the mean
of %Cath, is -1.64 with standard error of .319 at the mean less one standard
deviation, and is -2.75 with standard error of .298 at the mean plus one standard
deviation. Thus, following Catholic reform the Catholic marriage rate decreased.
This is in accord with my theoretical prediction. As opposed to those in Table 3.1,
the coefficients on Unilateral and No-fault in Table 3.2 only partially validate my
assumption that singles do not respond to changes in exit costs of civil marriage.
The coefficient on Unilateral is insignificant, but the coefficient on No-fault is
.644 and significant. The effect of No-fault is much smaller than the total effect
of Vatican on the Catholic marriage rate, displaying its relative unimportance in
an agent’s marital decision.
I am unable to test the response of the interfaith marriage rate with data
from the OCD. This is due to the fact the interfaith marriages counted in the OCD
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are only those sanctioned by the Catholic Church. This most likely eliminates
a large number of interfaith marriages. Additionally, no statistics prepared by
the US government contain questions regarding religion due to the separation
of church and state. No nation-wide surveys cover the entirety of the period I
am interested in studying. The survey that comes closest is the General Social
Survey (GSS), and it only begins in 1973. Thus, I turn to the empirical work of
other researchers who do their best to find a pattern in exogamy with inadequate
resources.
In 2007, the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate (CARA) at
Georgetown conducted a survey of a nationally-representative sample of 1008
Catholics regarding their marital behavior and knowledge of the Catholic insti-
tution of marriage[17]. The survey consisted of 4 birth cohorts, Pre-Vatican II
(pre-1943), Vatican II (1943-1960), Post-Vatican II (1961-1981), and Millennial
(post-1981). One of the questions asked of the respondents is if they are married
to a non-Catholic. 21% of the Pre-Vatican II generation responded affirmatively,
as did 28% of the Vatican II generation and 33% of the Post-Vatican II generation.
One sees a significant jump in exogamy in the first generation married under the
reforms of the late 1960s. Sherkat[34] and McCutcheon[28] both use at least 10
years of the GSS beginning in 1973. Both of these researchers also find a jump
between the exogamy rate of the pre-Vatican II generation and the Vatican II
generation.
Kalmijn[23] undertakes a more ambitious project; by combining the data
from numerous surveys, he constructs a series of decade-long marital cohorts that
stretches from the 1920s to the 1980s. He finds unambiguously that intermarriage
between Catholics and Protestants (the two largest religious groups in the US)
has increased by 65% over the last century. More relevant to this essay, he tests
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whether the social changes of the 1960s affected the slope or intercept of the
generally linear, downward trend of homogamy in his sample. He finds no evidence
that the social changes occurring in the 1960s affected the trend of intermarriage at
all. Kalmijn’s results can be reasonably questioned, though, due to the potential
biases that could arise from the melding of data across numerous surveys. Due to
the limitations on time-series data regarding religious homogamy, the empirical
results within the literature are mixed but seem to point to an increase in the
interfaith marriage rate after Vatican II and Humanae Vitae.
3.6 Conclusion
In this essay, I attempt to explain the absolute movements of the civil and
Catholic marriage rates during the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. During this
time period, the Catholic marriage rate fell approximately 20 percent relative to
the civil marriage rate. This relative decrease was the result of an increase of 2
percent in the civil marriage rate and a decrease of 17 percent in the Catholic
marriage rate. What makes this curious is that both before and after this period,
the two marriage rates followed the same trend. I propose and test the hypothesis
that the cause of the movements in the civil and Catholic marriage rates was
the Catholic reforms and decrees of the mid to late 1960s, that is, Vatican II
and Humanae Vitae. To do this, I construct an original model and compare
its implications against the implications of a fixed-effects regression analysis of a
nationwide panel of marriage rates.
The theory presented here is meant to capture the essence of an individual’s
marital decision. The model is populated by single and married agents. Single
agents have the option of entering a civil marital contract, entering both a civil and
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religious marital contract, or remaining single. The civil and religious institutions
of marriage are distinguishable due to their respective entry costs, exit costs, and
marital benefits. Notably, the benefit and the exit cost of a religious marriage is
dependent upon the number of believers in the model and whether religious reform
has been instituted. Before religious reform, this complementarity depends more
strongly upon the number of believers than after reform.
The theory is able to explain both the increase in the civil marriage rate
and the decrease in the Catholic marriage rate. After religious reform, the value
of entering into a religious marriage is decreased; as such, a smaller proportion
of the population enters into a religious marriage, and the religious marriage
rate decreases. A surprising result is that the institution of religious reform is
also able to explain the increase in the civil marriage rate. Since the value of a
religious marriage is decreased after religious reform, the option value of being
a single believer is decreased. Thus, single believers, who before might have
waited to find a high-quality match to marry both civilly and religiously, are
now willing to accept a lower-quality match to marry only civilly and to marry
immediately. This leads to an increase in the civil rate that would not have been
seen otherwise. Additionally, I present strong evidence that single agents making
a marital decision do not take into account the exit cost, or at least not changes
in the exit cost, of either marital contract. When marrying, single agents act as
if once married, they will remain married forever. This is contrary to previous
published results and contrary to the common intuition of economists.
Thus, my model is not only novel but useful. Previous models that have
looked on marriage as a single institution and examined an agent’s marital decision
have incompletely specified the motives of single agents. Due to this misspecifi-
cation, the decision of these agents has been modeled inaccurately. Also, these
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models have only been able to point to the reform of civil divorce law as a deter-
minant of marital behavior and have been silent on the changes in the religious
institution of marriage. As I have shown, civil divorce law reform is not a major
determinant of the change in marital behavior seen in the 1970s. My model also
draws the focus of research away from the effects of the changes in the exit costs
of the marital contracts and directs it toward the effects of the changes in the
benefits of these contracts.
In this chapter, I have focused on the short-run response of the marriage
rates to reforms. Future research should examine more closely the long-run effects
of these religious reforms. Specifically, it should focus on the changes in the
population of single and married believers that might have arisen in response
to reform and how these changes have effected the benefit and cost of marrying
civilly and religiously. This research could be conducted by supplementing the
panel presented here and conducting a long-run analysis of my model.
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Chapter 4
A Theoretical Model of Religiosity and the
Incidence of Domestic Violence
4.1 Introduction
Sociologists have demonstrated a negative correlation between religious
involvement and the incidence of domestic violence[9, 14]. They have struggled
though to uncover the specific pathway by which religious involvement affects
the incidence of domestic violence. Numerous pathways have been proposed and
found to be lacking. In addition, lacking a formal theory, it is unclear whether
religious involvement and domestic violence are even causally related or are mere
correlates. Therefore, in this essay, I propose and model a specific pathway con-
necting religious involvement and spousal abuse. I follow Mahoney et al. [25] and
propose sanctification, specifically the sanctification of marriage, as the pathway
that connects religious involvement and abusive behavior. I then test the reason-
ableness of this proposition by comparing the implications of the theory with the
empirical facts.
In the sociology literature, it has been shown that church attendance, the
most common measure of religious involvement, is inversely related to the inci-
dence of domestic violence. This effect is significant for men who attend services
at least once a week and for women who attend services at least once a month[9].
Following this work, Ellison and Anderson[10] examine three indirect pathways
by which religious involvement could potentially decrease the likelihood of domes-
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tic violence. They propose that those individuals highly involved in a religious
community would be more socially integrated and have access to a larger social
support system/network, would be less likely to abuse alcohol or drugs, and would
have a higher level of self-esteem and a greater sense of intrinsic self-worth. Con-
trolling for the above three pathways, the authors find that religious attendance
continues to be significantly and inversely related to the level of domestic vio-
lence. In fact, they find the above controls do not decrease the explanatory power
of attendance much, if at all. Therefore, one must look elsewhere for the pathway
connecting religiosity and the incidence of domestic violence.
In a series of papers[24, 25], the sanctification of family is proposed as the
specific means by which religion is able to influence domestic behavior. Mahoney
et al.[25] define sanctification as ”a psychological process through which aspects
of life are perceived by people as having spiritual character and significance” (p.
221). When an individual sanctifies his family, or, in this case, his marriage, he
perceives it as being a manifestation of his beliefs regarding the divine or, without
reference to a specific god, he may attribute certain sacred qualities to it, such
as holiness or eternalness. The initial findings of Mahoney and his co-authors
indicate that higher levels of sanctification of marriage are associated with less
frequent marital conflict and more collaboration to resolve disagreements. The
authors warn, though, that they are unsure if their results are generalizable due
to the limited nature of their sample. Specifically, they point out that sancti-
fication may well have negative consequences. For example, sanctification may
lead to a stubbornness of belief in regard to certain aspects of marital life that
when disagreed upon by spouses leads to a potentially intractable conflict. To
disentangle the positive and negative effects of sanctification, I formalize their
theory.
65
The theory presented here models a potentially abusive marriage. There
are two participants, the abuser (the husband) and the abused (the wife). The
abuser’s violent behavior serves two purposes, the first to vent stress and bring
pleasure to the abuser (expressive violence) and the second to control one’s spouse
(instrumental violence). These are the two main purposes of violent domestic
behavior documented by researchers[16]. In the model, each spouse must also
allocate a scarce amount of time between producing a marital good and a per-
sonal consumption good. The level to which an agent sanctifies his own marriage
affects his return to investing time in his marriage. The more an agent sancti-
fies his marriage, the higher the return he receives from investing his scarce time
in his relationship. Additionally, each spouse has a productivity parameter that
measures how effective he or she is at producing the personal consumption good.
In another version of the model not presented here, I instead modeled the hus-
band’s and wife’s utilities as being interdependent and sanctification as the weight
that each spouse placed on the other’s utility. The implications from these two
variants of the model are very similar. Thus, my theoretical predictions are not
idiosyncratic to the version of the model presented here.
The model predicts that the likelihood of violence is increasing in both the
husband’s and the wife’s level of sanctification and the wife’s productivity and is
decreasing the husband’s productivity and that the level of violence in an abusive
relationship is determined by the relative values (husband relative to the wife)
of sanctification and productivity. As the abuser’s level of sanctification relative
to the abused’s is increased, he becomes more abusive. As his productivity (in
making the personal consumption good) relative to the abused’s is increased, he
becomes less abusive. Also, I find that under fairly general conditions it is an
equilibrium outcome of the model for an abused spouse to remain in a violent
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relationship. It is perfectly reasonable for the abused spouse to remain in an
abusive relationship as long as she is being compensated for the abuse she is
receiving. The data partially match my theoretical predictions. With regard to
sanctification, the data partially match my results if I choose degree of theological
conservatism as a proxy for sanctification, but not if I choose church attendance.
With regard to productivity (in making the personal consumption good), the data
show that as the husband’s years of schooling increase, the likelihood of violence
decreases, but the wife’s years of schooling have no effect.
The economics literature offers few models of domestic violence and none
that incorporate religiosity. Tauchen et al.[39] construct a model that includes
both expressive and instrumental violence. My model differs from theirs in that
I include sanctification and model a sequential game. Farmer et al.[12] develop
a model very similar to Tauchen et al.’s with similar predictions. Pollak[32] con-
structs an intergenerational model of domestic violence in which violent tenden-
cies are transferred from parent to child. He focuses on how violent tendencies are
passed from generation to generation. His model is solely probabilistic and lacks
any form of optimizing behavior; and the motivation for violence in his model is
solely expressive.
4.2 Theory
I model a non-cooperative, violent situation in a marital household. This
situation involves two participants, a husband and a wife. I assume that the hus-
band is the individual who uses violence and that the wife is the individual toward
whom the husband’s violent behavior is directed. The husband uses violence for
two purposes. First, the husband derives utility directly from behaving violently
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toward his wife. This benefit could be due to sadistic reasons or due to the fact
that the violence serves as a means of venting stress. This type of violence is
referred to as expressive violence. Second, the husband uses violence as means of
coercing his wife to behave in a certain manner. This type of violence is referred
to as instrumental violence.
The husband’s utility is a function of the level of violence v that he chooses,
the quality of his marriage Q, and his consumption ch. The quality of a marriage Q
is sum of the marital good Mh produced by the husband and the marital good Mw
produced by the wife. The husband is only able to receive the benefit of engaging
in violent behavior or of Q if he is married. His utility function is uh(v, Q, ch)
and is increasing in all three arguments. The husband has a fixed amount of
time T that he must allocate between producing his marital good Mh and his
consumption good ch. The time that the husband devotes to the production of
the marital good, thm, is transformed into g(t
h
m, S
h) units of Mh. Sh is the degree
to which the husband sanctifies his marriage. The return to investing time in the




time that the husband devotes to the production of his consumption good, thc , is
transformed into f(thc , A




is increasing in Ah. The husband has an outside option that
gives him utility uh(T, Ah), which is equal to uh(0, 0, f(T, Ah)), if he leaves the
relationship. I assume the husband remains in the marriage if his utility in the
relationship is at least as large as his utility if single.
The wife’s utility function is uw(v,Q, cw). Her utility is decreasing in the
level of violence v, and is increasing in all other arguments. The wife must also
allocate a fixed amount of time T between producing a marital good Mw and
producing a consumption good cw. If she devotes twm to the production of M
w, the
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wife produces g(twm, S
w) units of Mw. Notice that the wife potentially sanctifies
her marriage at a level distinct from her husband, that is, Sw is not necessarily
equal to Sh. The time she devotes to the production of her consumption good,
twc , is transformed into f(t
w
c , A
w) units of cw, where Aw is the wife’s productivity
parameter. Both the husband and the wife use the same functions g(·) and f(·).
The wife has an outside option that gives her utility εw if she leaves the rela-
tionship. This outside option is randomly draw from the distribution F (·) with
support [−b, b], where b > 0. εw is drawn before any agent moves and is observable
to all agents. I assume that the wife remains in the marriage as long as her utility
in the relationship is at least as large as her utility if single.
The situation unfolds as follows. First, the wife chooses her level of twm and
twc . After which, the husband chooses whether he desires to remain in the marriage
or become single. If he remains in the marriage, he then chooses v, thm, and t
h
c .
If he exits the marriage, he receives uh(T, Ah). If the husband chooses to remain
in the marriage, the wife then chooses whether to remain in the marriage or exit
and receive εw. In addition to the non-violation of the two spouses’ participation
constraints, I impose the condition that for a marriage to be sustained, at least
one spouse must devote a strictly positive amount of time to the marriage; either
twm or t
h
m must be positive for a marriage to be sustained. One spouse is able to
exit the marriage without the consent of the other, and there are no exit costs
associating with leaving a marriage. All payoffs and moves are public information
in this game. Due to this and the sequential nature of this game, the wife is able
take into account the husband’s reaction when making her choices.
I solve this game by means of backwards induction for the case of a contin-
uing marriage. First, I solve the husband’s maximization problem. The husband’s
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problem is to maximize uh(v,Q, ch) subject to
thm + t
h
c = T = 1
ch = f(thc , A
h) = Ahthc
Mh = g(thm, S
h) = Shthm
Q = Mw + Mh
and to the constraints that both he and his wife choose to remain in the marriage,
that is,
uh(v, Mw∗ + Mh, ch) ≥ uh(T, Ah) = uh(0, 0, f(T, Ah)) (4.1)
uw(v,Mw∗ + Mh, cw∗) ≥ εw. (4.2)
Mw∗ and cw∗ are the wife’s optimal choices; the husband takes these as given.

























≤ 0, comp. slack v ≥ 0 (4.4)
with λh being the multiplier on the husband’s outside option (4.1) and λw being
the multiplier on the wife’s outside option (4.2). The husband chooses thm to
satisfy equation (4.3). If thm is positive, (4.3) holds with equality. The husband
chooses v to satisfy equation (4.4). Once again, if v is positive, then (4.4) holds





















is the husband’s comparative advantage in producing his con-
sumption good.
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After solving the husband’s problem, I then solve the wife’s optimization
problem taking into account the effect that her own choices have on her husband’s
choices. In other words, she maximizes taking v(Mw) and Mh(Mw) as given. She
maximizes uw(v(M
w), Q, cw) subject to
twm + t
w
c = T = 1
cw = f(twc , A
w) = Awtwc
Mw = g(twm, S
w) = Swtwm
Q = Mw + Mh(Mw).

















Aw ≤ 0, comp. slack twm ≥ 0 (4.6)
which holds with equality if twm is positive. I divide (4.6) by S

















Awr ≤ 0. (4.7)
This condition depends upon the wife’s comparative advantage in producing the
consumption good, Awr =
Aw
Sw
, and upon her husband’s level of sanctification
relative to her own level, that is, Sr =
Sh
Sw
. Having presented the model, I next
describe the equilibria of the model.
4.3 Determinants of the Likelihood of Domestic Violence
The equilibria of this model can be divided into three sets, one in which
the marriage is dissolved, one in which the marriage is sustained and there is no
violence, and one in which the marriage is sustained and there is violence. By
assumption, either spouse is able to leave the marriage without the consent of the
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other. Therefore, it is impossible to have an equilibrium outcome in which one
spouse chooses to remain and one chooses to leave. I describe the equilibria in
which the marriage is sustained.
Lemma 1. If a marriage is sustained, λh = 0
Proof. By assumption, a necessary condition for a marriage to be sustained is
that either Mh or Mw must be strictly greater than 0. Assuming v is 0, Q greater
than 0 implies that uh(v,Q = Mw + Mh, ch) > uh(T, Ah) = uh(0, 0, f(T, Ah)). If
v > 0, the lhs is increased even more.
Lemma 2. Given that
∂uh
∂v
> 0 and the couple chooses to remain married, λw > 0.




One should note that the wife’s participation constraint (4.2) could bind
for two reasons. Assuming a relatively small εw, the husband would choose a v
such that the wife’s utility in the marriage is equal to her outside option. It is also
possible that the wife’s constraint binds because her outside option is sufficiently
large.
Lemma 3. There can be no instrumental violence without expressive violence.
The violence in the model can be divided into expressive and instrumental
violence. Expressive violence is the violence that would result in the model if the
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wife was unable to influence the husband’s level of v. The underlying cause of
expressive violence is the husband’s marginal utility of violence. If this is positive,
then expressive violence can be positive; otherwise, it is 0. Instrumental violence
is the modification to the level of expressive level that derives from the wife’s




non-zero. The larger this derivative in absolute value the more impact the wife’s








≤ 0 and dv
dMw
> 0.
Lemma 4. Given that
∂uh
∂v
> 0 and εw ≤ uw(0, 0, f(T, Aw)), it cannot be the case
that both (1) a marriage is sustained and (2) v = 0.
Proof. Assume that there is a sustained marriage in which v = 0. By assumption,
Mh or Mw > 0. Since v = 0, uw(0, Q, f(twc , A





Lemma 4 states that for a marriage to be non-violent, the wife’s outside
option must be larger than her utility from devoting all her time to production
of her personal consumption good with no gains from marriage or losses from
violence, that is, her utility as a single producer. Thus, this demonstrates that
if a relationship is violent, it must be the case that εw is sufficiently small. A
large εw gives the woman more bargaining power and therefore a buffer against
the husband’s potential for violence.
Theorem 1. The likelihood of violence is decreasing in εw.
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This follows from Lemma 4 and the fact that when εw > uw(0, 0, f(T, Aw)),
violence is possible but not a given.
Lemma 5. It is a equilibrium outcome for a wife to remain in an abusive relation-
ship.
This follows from Lemma 4. A wife remains in an abusive relationship
under fairly general conditions. As long as she is being compensated in the
marriage for the abuse she is suffering, she has no reason to leave the relation-
ship. Even more interesting is that she could be compensating herself. If her
comparative advantage in producing the marital good is sufficiently large but
her husband’s is not, it could be the case that Mw > 0 and Mh = 0. Thus,
uw(0,Mw, f(twc , A
w)) > uw(0, 0, f(T,Aw)). Then, her husband could choose v to
make this constraint bind, and the wife would still choose to remain in the violent
relationship.
Lemma 6. If a marriage is sustained and there is no violence, thm > 0 and t
w
m = 0.
Proof. From Lemma 3,
dv
dMw











The wife devotes none of her time to the marriage and all of her time to the
production of her personal consumption good. If the marriage is sustained, it
must be the case that Mh > 0; therefore, thm > 0.
Theorem 2. The likelihood of domestic violence is increasing in Sh, Sw, and Aw
and is decreasing in Ah.
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Proof. If the optimal Q∗ and tw∗ are such that uw(0, Q∗, Awtw∗m ) < ε
w, then the
marriage cannot be sustained. This is true because the wife’s participation con-
straint is violated. If uw(0, Q∗, Awtw∗m ) = ε
w, then the marriage is sustained and
v = 0. If uw(0, Q∗, Awtw∗m ) > ε
w, then the marriage is sustained and v > 0. These
two statements follow from the optimality conditions and the fact that there needs
to be slack in the wife’s constraint for the husband to choose a positive amount of
violence. Thus any parameter change that leads to an increase in the optimal Q∗
or tw∗ (and thus to an increase in uw(·)) increases the likelihood of violence.
4.4 Determinants of the Level of Domestic Violence
I now examine the determinants of the level of domestic violence in the
model. The last section demonstrated that the likelihood of domestic violence is
increasing Sh, Sw, and Aw and it is decreasing in Ah and εw. In this section, I
assume that violence occurs and show what determines the amount of violence
chosen by the husband. There are three specific cases in the model when violence
occurs in a relationship. These cases are: (1) Mw > 0 and Mh = 0, (2) Mw = 0
and Mh > 0, and (3) Mw > 0 and Mh > 0. The most reasonable case of the
three is case 3. This is due to the fact that even in the worst of relationships
each partner most likely devotes some strictly positive amount of time to the
relationship.
Thus, the relationship I examine has strictly positive amounts of v, Mw,
and Mh. Due to this fact, the husband’s two first-order conditions and the wife’s
single first-order condition hold with equality. Also, recall that when the spouses
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choose to remain in a violent marriage, λh = 0 and λw > 0. Thus, the first-order

































These are the conditions for v, thm, and t
w








λw is the shadow price of an additional unit of his wife’s utility in the eyes of the
husband. This can thought of as the price of violence. λw determines the maximal
amount the husband would pay to purchase more utility for his wife so that he
could increase v and still keep his wife’s utility large enough so that she remains
















To derive specific predictions from the model, I assume that uh(v,Q, ch) =
(1 + vα
h
)Qβ + ch and that uw(v, Q, cw) = (1 − vαw)Qβ + cw with αh ∈ (0, 1),
αw ∈ (1,∞), and β ∈ (0, 1). Substituting these specific functions into the above













and the relative level of sanctification,
Sh
Sw
, are the factors that ultimately dictate
the amount of violence in the marriage.
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From the above equation, one is able to derive two theoretical predictions,
one regarding the spouses’ relative productivity and one regarding the spouses’
relative level of sanctification. Note that the left-hand side of equation (4.13) is
increasing in v. Thus, with regard to the relative productivity level of the two
spouses, one finds that as the husband (or the abuser) becomes more productive






This occurs because the husband would prefer to spend more of his scarce time
in producing his personal consumption good and less in producing the marital
good. To compensate for the time that the husband is not spending in producing
the marital good, he motivates his wife to produce more of the marital good by
offering a less violent relationship.
With regard to the relative level of sanctification of the spouses, I find that
as the husband (or the abuser) increases his level of sanctification relative to his





In this situation, the husband prefers to devote his time to the marriage rather
than to the production of the consumption good. Due to this, he does not need
to use violence as a motivating factor and can increase v.
4.5 Empirical Implications
To test my theoretical predictions, I use the National Survey of Families
and Households (NSFH), Wave 1. The NSFH-1 is a national survey conducted in
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1987-88 by researchers at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. These researchers
oversampled certain segments of the population, for example, African-Americans
and Puerto Ricans. This survey contains data on both primary respondents and
their spouses or partners. Primary respondents completed an in-person interview
and a self-administered questionnaire. The spouse or partner only completed a
self-administered questionnaire. In the following analysis, all data are weighted to
account for oversampling and differential response rates to the questionnaires. In
my analysis, I focus on primary respondents who are currently married and living
with their spouse. Additionally, I require that the spouse completed the relevant
questionnaire.
The NSFH-1 collected data on the incidence of domestic violence, religious
behavior, and other socioecononomic characteristics of both the primary respon-
dent and spouse. From these data, I construct a domestic violence indicator that
takes on the value 1 if the husband has engaged in domestic abuse in the last
year; it is 0 otherwise.1 I focus on male-perpetrated domestic abuse because it is
generally believed that female-perpetrated violence is more defensive in nature.
In the following regressions, this indicator is the dependent variable.
I construct two indices that measure a spouse’s level of sanctification. To
construct the first, I assume that religious involvement as measured by church
attendance and one’s level of sanctification are highly and positively correlated.
Thus, I use church attendance as a proxy for sanctification. I construct an index
for both the husband and wife that takes on four values, 0 if the spouse attends
less than once a year, 1 if the spouse attends several times per year, 2 if the
1My empirical work closely follows that of Ellison et al.[9], including both the indices that I
construct and the regressions I run. My work is largely a replication of theirs.
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spouse attends 1 to 3 times per month, and 3 if the spouse attends at least once
per week. I use these indices for two purposes. First, from the two indices I create
a set of three indicators for each spouse that correspond to the index values of 1, 2,
and 3. Second, I subtract the female attendance index from the male attendance
index; this difference takes on values from 3 to -3. From this difference I create
four indicators that measure relative church attendance between spouses. If this
difference is ≥ 2, I say that the ”man attends much more”; if it is = 1, the ”man
attends somewhat more”; if it is = -1, the ”woman attends somewhat more”; and
if it is ≤ −2, the ”woman attends much more.”
To construct the second index, I assume that an individual’s theological
conservatism is highly and positively correlated with his level of sanctification. I
measure an individual’s theological conservatism by his agreement to two survey
statements, ”The Bible is God’s word and everything happened or will happen
exactly as it says,” and ”The Bible is the answer to all human problems.” The
respondent’s possible responses vary from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly
agree. An individual’s degree of theological conservatism is measured as his aver-
age response to these two statements. I construct such an index for both husband
and wife. Once again, I use these indices for two purposes. First, I create three
indicators that correspond to the index values of ≥ 4 (conservative), ≥ 2.5 and
≤ 3.5 (moderate), and ≤ 2 (liberal). Second, I measure a couple’s relative conser-
vatism by subtracting the woman’s index from the man’s. I then construct four
indicators corresponding to values of this difference. If the difference is ≥ 1.5,
the ”man is much more conservative”; if it is ≤ 1.5 and ≥ 0, the ”man is some-
what more conservative”; if it is ≤ 0 and ≥ −1.5, the ”woman is somewhat more
conservative”; and if it is ≤ −1.5, the ”woman is much more conservative.”
I test the effect of both church attendance and theological conservatism
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Domestic Violence .045 .208 0 1
Male Attendance
Several times per year .174 .379 0 1
1-3 times per month .162 .369 0 1
At least once per week .302 .459 0 1
Female Attendance
Several times per year .159 .365 0 1
1-3 times per month .167 .373 0 1
At least once per week .394 .489 0 1
Couple’s attendance dissimilarity
Man attends much more .025 .157 0 1
Man attends somewhat more .085 .279 0 1
Woman attends somewhat more .167 .373 0 1
Woman attends much more .105 .307 0 1
Male Theological Conservatism
Liberal .363 .481 0 1
Moderate .454 .498 0 1
Conservative .182 .386 0 1
Female Theological Conservatism
Liberal .427 .495 0 1
Moderate .433 .496 0 1
Conservative .139 .346 0 1
Couple’s theological dissimilarity
Man much more conservative .022 .148 0 1
Man somewhat more conservative .236 .424 0 1
Woman somewhat more conservative .146 .353 0 1
Woman much more conservative .014 .116 0 1
Covariates
Personal income 30773.57 41485.36 0 800000
Woman’s earning share .282 .245 0 1
Education 12.95 3.13 0 20
Educational difference .109 2.61 -15 14
African-American .084 .278 0 1
Hispanic .066 .249 0 1
Age 41.9 14.6 17 89
Unemployed .697 .460 0 1
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on the likelihood of domestic violence by means of a logit regression. My results
are presented in Table 4.2. ”Personal income” is the income (this includes all
sources of income save investments) of the husband. ”Woman’s earning share”
is the woman’s income divided by the couple’s total income. ”Education” is the
educational attainment of the husband in years, and ”Educational difference”
is the husband’s educational attainment less the wife’s. ”African-American” is
an indicator that is 1 if the husband is African-American, and ”Hispanic” is an
indicator that is 1 if the husband is Hispanic. ”Age” is the age of the husband
in years. Finally, ”Unemployed” is an indicator that is 1 if either spouse was
unemployed and looking for work in the previous year. I consider both the income
and education variables as proxies for the productivity parameters in the model.
The descriptive statistics for the indices and other covariates are listed in
Table 4.1. Only 4.5 percent of couples in the sample reported at least one incident
of domestic violence in the last year. Also, of this percentage, the vast majority
of respondents report exactly one incident. Examining the ”Male Attendance”
variables, one sees that if a man does attend services, he most likely attends
on a weekly basis. 30.2 percent of males attend church on a weekly basis, 16.2
percent 1 to 3 times per month and 17.4 percent several times per year. The same
observation holds for women. Additionally, women are more likely to attend on a
weekly basis than men, 39.4 percent of the sample versus 30.2. This agrees with
the fact that the female attends services more than the male in 27.2 percent of
couples; the male attends more than the female in only 11 percent of couples
Turning now to the ”Theological Conservatism” variables, one sees that a
man is more likely to be conservative than a female (18.2 percent versus 13.9),
about equally likely to be moderate (45.4 percent versus 43.3), and less likely to
be liberal (36.3 percent versus 42.7). In contrast to attendance dissimilarity, 25.8
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Table 4.2: Main Estimation Results
Dependent variable: Domestic Violence Indicator
(1) (2) (3)
Male Attendance
Several times per year - -.160 (.852) -
1-3 times per month - -.331 (.718) -
At least once per week - -1.15 (.317)** -
Female Attendance
Several times per year - -.108 (.898) -
1-3 times per month - -.151 (.860) -
At least once per week - .157 (1.17) -
Male Theological Conservatism
Moderate - - .940 (1.10)
Conservative - - .635 (1.89)**
Female Theological Conservatism
Moderate - - -.514 (.598)*
Conservative - - -.002(.998)
Covariates
Personal income 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 (1.00)
Woman’s earning share .309 (1.36) .224 (1.25) .251 (1.29)
Education -.127 (.881)** -.105 (.900)* -.152 (.859)***
Educational difference .051 (1.05) .042 (1.04) .056 (1.06)
African-American 1.11 (3.03)*** 1.18 (3.24)*** 1.12 (3.05)***
Hispanic -.568 (.567) -.440 (.644) -.626 (.535)
Age -.078 (.925)*** -.074 (.928)*** -.081 (.922)***
Unemployed -.437 (.646)* -.411 (.663)* -.427 (.652)*
Pseudo R2 .100 .116 .111
Notes: In the above logit regressions, the male is always the perpetrator of domes-
tic violence. Unless otherwise noted, the covariates refer to characteristics of the
male spouse. The data are from the National Survey of Families and Households,
Wave 1. Each entry is a logit regression coefficient. The respective odds ratios
are reported in parentheses. ***significant at the 1% level. **significant at the
5% level. *significant at the 10% level.
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percent of couples consist of a male who is more conservative than his spouse;
whereas, only 16 percent consist of a female who is the more conservative spouse.
Rarely is it the case, though, that one spouse is much more conservative theo-
logically than the other; this occurs in 3.6 percent of couples. Additionally, the
woman typically earns about 28 percent of the couple’s total income, though she
is on average as well educated as her husband. The average difference in education
between husband and wife is .109 years. Given that the mean age of the sample
is 41.9 years, it is surprising that nearly 70 percent of couples report having at
least one spouse unemployed and looking for work in the previous year.
My main interest lies in regressions (2) and (3) in Table 4.2. Recall that the
model predicts that the likelihood of violence increases in the level of sanctification
of both the husband and wife when productivity is controlled for. In regression
(2), the only attendance coefficient that is significant is the coefficient on ”At
least once per week” for the male; but it is negative. In regression (3), if the male
is theologically conservative, the likelihood of violence is increased; but if the
female is theologically moderate, the likelihood of violence is decreased. Perhaps,
a moderate partner is more amenable to her spouse’s beliefs and therefore less
likely to engage in an argument over religious belief; whereas, a conservative
partner holds firmly to his beliefs and is willing to fight when these beliefs are
challenged.
One can see that across both of these regressions the coefficient on ”Educa-
tion” is negative and significant. This is in accord with the theoretical predictions.
The model also predicts the wife’s educational level would increase the likelihood
of violence. I substituted the wife’s years of schooling for ”Educational differ-
ence” and her personal income for ”Woman’s earning share”, but neither of these
variables explained the likelihood of violence. ”African-American” and ”Age” are
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Table 4.3: Additional Estimation Results
Dependent variable: Domestic Violence Indicator
(1) (2) (3)
Couple’s attendance dissimilarity
Man attends much more - .560 (1.75) -
Man attends somewhat more - .120 (1.13) -
Woman attends somewhat more - .170 (1.18) -
Woman attends much more - .538 (1.71)* -
Couple’s theological dissimilarity
Man much more conservative - - .873 (2.39)
Man somewhat more conservative - - .427 (1.53)*
Woman somewhat more conservative - - .199 (1.22)
Woman much more conservative - - .823 (1.09)
Covariates
Personal income 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 (1.00)
Woman’s earning share .309 (1.36) .319 (1.38) .308 (1.36)
Education -.127 (.881)** -.123 (.884)** -.137 (.872)**
Educational difference .051 (1.05) .051 (1.05) .054 (1.06)
African-American 1.11 (3.03)*** 1.05 (2.87)*** 1.17 (3.22)***
Hispanic -.568 (.567) -.555 (.574) -.558 (.573)
Age -.078 (.925)*** -.078 (.925)*** -.078 (.923)***
Unemployed -.437 (.646)* -.416 (.660)* -.426 (.653)*
Pseudo R2 .100 .104 .105
Notes: see Table 4.2.
always highly significant. The coefficient on ”Unemployed” is negative and signif-
icant at the 10 percent level. This is odd as one would expect this coefficient to
be positive and increase the likelihood of domestic violence; in fact, Ellison and
his co-authors find this coefficient to be positive and significant. The results only
partially match my theoretical predictions. In regard to sanctification, the results
depend on what proxy is chosen for sanctification, and in regard to productivity,
only the male’s education seems to matter.
I am unable to test the theoretical predictions regarding the level of domes-
tic violence in a relationship. This is due to the fact that so very few of the couples
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that report that violence has occurred report more than one incident. Instead, I
examine whether the relative values of sanctification and productivity affect the
likelihood of domestic violence since I do have a sufficient amount of data for these
regressions. My results are presented in Table 4.3. Once again, one can see that
my results depend upon which proxy for sanctification I choose. In regression (2),
if the woman attends service much more than the man, the likelihood of violence
increases; and if the man is somewhat more conservative theologically than the
woman the likelihood of violence is increased. The remaining covariates behave
as in the previous regressions in Table 4.2.
4.6 Conclusion
In the sociology literature, the connection between religious involvement
and the incidence of domestic violence has been demonstrated, but both the path-
way linking religious involvement and domestic violence and a formal model of
that pathway has yet to be provided. In this essay, I attempt to remedy that defi-
ciency by proposing sanctification as the pathway and by constructing a theoreti-
cal model causally connecting religious involvement and the incidence of domestic
violence through this pathway.
In my theory, an agent must allocate a fixed amount of time between pro-
ducing a personal consumption good and a marital good. Sanctification increases
an agent’s return to investing time in his marriage. Therefore, as an agent’s level
of sanctification increases, his incentive to invest time in his marriage increases.
Additionally, the husband chooses a level of domestic violence in which to engage.
Due to the sequential nature of the model, the husband’s violence decision is in-
fluenced by both his own and his wife’s idiosyncratic levels of sanctification and
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productivity.
The data partially match my theoretical predictions. With regard to sanc-
tification, the data partially match my results if I choose theological belief as a
proxy for sanctification, but not if I choose church attendance as the proxy. Thus,
a future project would examine in more detail the definition of sanctification and
what proxies most exactly capture that concept. With regard to productivity (in
making the personal consumption good), the data show that as the husband’s
years of schooling increase, the likelihood of violence decreases, but the wife’s
years of schooling have no effect.
Potentially fruitful modifications of the model include explicitly modeling
the wife’s outside option to depend upon parameters such as her own productiv-
ity, the psychological effect that violence has upon the abused, her wealth, or her
social network. A useful addition would be a legal cost or social stigma that is in-
curred by the abusive partner. Additionally, it would be interesting to investigate
how sanctification affects domestic behavior in other dimensions beside violence.
Future research will include these modifications and attempt to bridge the gap




My goal in this dissertation has been to model domestic behavior as de-
pendent upon personal religious beliefs and religious norms with the aim of more
fully specifying an individual’s motivation for action and more accurately pre-
dicting his behavior. To accomplish this goal, I construct two original models,
one describing a single agent’s marital decision and one describing a potentially
abusive marriage. In the former model, I incorporate a religious norm into the
agent’s marital decision by modeling marriage as a set of two contracts, one civil
and one religious, and by having the benefits and costs of the religious contract
be dependent upon aggregate social belief in the religious institution of marriage.
In the latter model, I incorporate an individual agent’s religiosity by having his
return to investing in his marriage depend positively upon the degree to which he
sanctifies his marriage.
In Chapters 2 and 4, I present strong, empirical evidence that an agent’s
domestic behavior depends upon his religious beliefs and responds to changes in
religious norms and institutions. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate that the divergence
that is seen between the civil and Catholic marriage rates is due largely to changes
in the Catholic institution of marriage and not to changes in the civil institution of
marriage, and, following in Chapter 3, I demonstrate that the absolute movement
of these rates is also largely a response to changes in the structure of Catholic mar-
riage. In Chapter 4, I show that the likelihood of domestic violence in a marriage
in which the two spouses are currently cohabiting is influenced by the strength
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of religious belief of each of the spouses. The evidence presented in Chapter 4
is largely a replication of the ongoing work of Ellison and his co-authors[9, 10].
Given these observations, it seems necessary to build theoretical models of do-
mestic behavior that include religiosity and religious norms, but these models for
the most part have yet to be constructed. Specifically, with regard to marital
behavior and to the incidence of domestic violence, these models do not exist.
In Chapter 3, I construct and analyze a search model that describes the
marital decision of a single agent who must choose to marry civilly, marry civilly
and religiously, or to remain single. This model predicts that the reform of civil
divorce law will not affect either the civil or religious marital behavior of single
agents. It also predicts that the reform of the religious institution of marriage
as seen in the US in the 1960s will decrease the religious marriage rate, increase
the interfaith marriage rate, and increase the civil marriage rate. In Chapter 4,
I construct and analyze a model that describes the violence decision made by a
potentially abusive husband and the time allocation decisions of both husband
and wife. The model predicts that the likelihood of violence will increase in
the idiosyncratic religiosities and decrease in the idiosyncratic productivities of
both the husband and wife. It also predicts that if violence occurs, the level
of violence in the relationship is determined by the relative values of religiosity
and productivity, that is, the value of the husband’s religiosity (or productivity)
relative to his wife’s. The level of violence increases as the husband becomes more
religious as compared to his wife, and it decreases as the husband becomes more
productive as compared to his wife.
Given these theoretical predictions, the most salient question to ask is, are
these predictions more accurate than those of previous models that do not incor-
porate religious belief? To some degree these two theories necessarily make more
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accurate predictions, in the sense that they actually make predictions regarding
religiosity and its effect on behavior, whereas previous models have nothing to say
regarding religiosity and its effects. In addition to this, the theoretical predictions
of my marriage model match the empirical implications of the data with reference
to all three marriage rates. So this model is a significant improvement over pre-
vious models, since it matches not only the movements of secular variables but
also religious variables. The theoretical predictions of my domestic violence model
regarding productivity match the data fairly well, but the predictions regarding
religiosity only partially match the data. These mixed results could be due to
the vagueness of the definition of sanctification, or religiosity, and the proxy that
I chose for sanctification. Thus, it is generally the case that the predictions of
these models improve upon those of existing models since they match the empiri-
cal implications with reference to secular variables and generally do a good job of
matching the empirical implications with reference to religious variables.
In my future research, I would like to expand the scope of the work con-
ducted in this dissertation. I hope to do this in two ways. First of all, I would
like to continue to study the two models presented here and modify them so as to
understand more fully the discrepancies between the theory and data. Secondly, I
would like to incorporate religiosity and religious complementarities more widely
in models of domestic behavior because as of now these elements are conspicuously
missing throughout the economics literature.
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